Broken Nuclear Vows: Explaining Why States Cheat on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) was created in 1968 to promote the peaceful use of nuclear technology and to ensure against the spread of nuclear weapons. Today, it remains as the most widely subscribed arms treaty in history with 190 signatory states. The fact that nuclear weapons have not been used since World War II and that fewer than ten nuclear armed states exist today speak to the NPT’s success in its non-proliferation efforts. However, while the NPT has been remarkably effective in preventing the widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons, countries such as Iran and North Korea have still managed to violate the treaty. It thus begs the question of why and when do states decide to violate the NPT? Do they sign onto the treaty with an intention to violate? If so, why bother signing at all?

This thesis uses four existing frameworks that help explain proliferation decisions to examine why states may decide to violate the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: 1) the security model, 2) the norms model, 3) the domestic politics model, and 4) the economic integration model. While past research has focused primarily on leaders’ proliferation decisions regardless of NPT status, this thesis helps to understand why non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) may choose to violate the treaty. Using a quantitative analysis of all NPT signatories, as well as an in-depth case study of South Korea's violations in the 1970s and 2000s, this thesis argues that leaders decide to violate and/or comply with the NPT for reasons outside of the traditional security argument.

Whang, Yegina. (2016). Broken Nuclear Vows: Explaining Why States Cheat on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
. Stanford Digital Repository. Available at: http://purl.stanford.edu/zz173tq2915