Ignorance, capacitarian control, and responsibility
- This work is about the connection between ignorance and responsibility. It addresses the questions of what it takes for agents to be responsible for their ignorance of morally relevant considerations (both normative and factual) and for the unwitting wrongdoing prompted by it. This topic has recently commanded a great deal of attention in light of some skeptical arguments purporting to show that agents are rarely (if ever) blameworthy for their ignorance and their unwitting wrongdoing. In the dissertation I address these arguments, diagnose their weak points, and propose a conception of responsibility-relevant control—the capacitarian account—that not only is able to rebut those arguments but also provides a fruitful way to explain responsibility for ignorance and unwitting wrongdoing. Along the way I also touch on a variety of related topics such as the epistemic condition on responsibility, the capacities that matter for responsible agency, how we attribute unexercised capacities to wrongdoers, the content and justification of judgments of blameworthiness, the structure of negligence, the distinction between factual and moral ignorance, and whether the latter sometimes exculpates.
|Type of resource
|electronic; electronic resource; remote
|1 online resource.
|Rudy Hiller, Fernando Efrain
|Stanford University, Department of Philosophy.
|Statement of responsibility
|Fernando Efrain Rudy Hiller.
|Submitted to the Department of Philosophy.
|Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2016.
- © 2016 by Fernando Efrain Rudy Hiller
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).
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