Dynamic matching : a queueing perspective
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- This dissertation focuses on frictions that arise in various dynamic marketplaces such as kidney exchange, labor markets, and logistics. The central question that we ask is how do heterogeneity, network structure, liquidity, and stochasticity, which cause these frictions, affect our ability to perform simple policies that can achieve efficient outcomes? In Chapters 2 and 3, we analyze dynamic matching markets. When agents arrive to the market over time, an inherent trade-off arises between short- and long-term allocative efficiency. For example, kidney exchange platforms, which arrange exchanges between incompatible patient-donor pairs, can form a match as soon as it becomes feasible, or wait for the market to thicken in order to generate exchanges that yield more life years from transplants. This trade-off raises several questions. How to optimally match agents over time? If the market is cleared periodically, how does the period length affect allocative efficiency at different times? How does stochastic demand impact desirable clearing times? We study these questions from a queueing perspective, and we propose simple batching and greedy policies with a strong performance guarantee: these policies (nearly) maximize the total match value simultaneously at all times. This suggests that the tension between short- and long-term allocative efficiency is essentially moot. In Chapter 4, we analyze scrip systems, where such systems serve an alternative to sustain cooperation, improve efficiency, and mitigate free riding in economies without monetary transfers. Agents request and provide service over time, and scrips are used as artificial currency to pay for service provision. We study the possibility of agents sustaining cooperation when the market is thin, in the sense that only few agents are available to provide the requested service. We analyze the stability of the scrip distribution of agents, assuming that among the available agents, the one with the minimum amount of scrips is selected to provide service. The analysis suggests that even with minimal liquidity in the market, cooperation can be sustained by balancing service provisions among agents. Simulations based on kidney exchange data propose that scrip systems can lead to efficient outcomes in kidney exchange by sustaining cooperation between hospitals.
Description
| Type of resource | text |
|---|---|
| Form | electronic resource; remote; computer; online resource |
| Extent | 1 online resource. |
| Place | California |
| Place | [Stanford, California] |
| Publisher | [Stanford University] |
| Copyright date | 2022; ©2022 |
| Publication date | 2022; 2022 |
| Issuance | monographic |
| Language | English |
Creators/Contributors
| Author | Kerimov, Süleyman |
|---|---|
| Degree supervisor | Ashlagi, Itai |
| Degree supervisor | Gurvich, Itai |
| Thesis advisor | Ashlagi, Itai |
| Thesis advisor | Gurvich, Itai |
| Thesis advisor | Lo, Irene, (Management science professor) |
| Degree committee member | Lo, Irene, (Management science professor) |
| Associated with | Stanford University, Department of Management Science and Engineering |
Subjects
| Genre | Theses |
|---|---|
| Genre | Text |
Bibliographic information
| Statement of responsibility | Süleyman Kerimov. |
|---|---|
| Note | Submitted to the Department of Management Science and Engineering. |
| Thesis | Thesis Ph.D. Stanford University 2022. |
| Location | https://purl.stanford.edu/zy203gy2625 |
Access conditions
- Copyright
- © 2022 by Suleyman Kerimov
- License
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).
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