The risks of nuclear states' signals of resolve
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- This dissertation presents three studies on the risks of nuclear states' signals of resolve. I examine how nuclear states manage the dual nuclear foreign policy goals of 1) reassuring allies that nuclear proliferation is not necessary for their security and 2) deterring adversaries from using or acquiring nuclear weapons. Traditionally, these aims are accomplished through demonstrations of states' resolve to use their nuclear arsenals to defend allies or attack adversaries. Existing literature posits that the main challenge for nuclear states lies in making these demonstrations sufficiently credible. I examine the conditions under which these demonstrations work. I argue that, while insufficiently credible demonstrations of resolve can fail to reassure allies and deter adversaries, overly credible demonstrations of resolve can also backfire. I examine this phenomenon in the context of nuclear security on the Korean Peninsula. Backfire occurs in two critical, but underappreciated, ways. First, while nuclear states' demonstrations of resolve are designed to reassure their allies of defense commitments, I use survey experiments among the South Korean public to show that highly credible U.S. nuclear security guarantees can backfire. These guarantees create public fears of entrapment in precipitous nuclear conflicts. In this way, a guarantor's demonstrations of resolve can drive citizens in the allied state to support more independent security policies, including the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Second, I show that demonstrations of resolve can create and escalate crises by posing threats that cause adversaries to respond aggressively. I demonstrate that US-South Korean joint military exercises do not deter North Korea. Instead, North Korea systematically responds to exercises with rhetorical and military belligerence. In addition, I show that North Korean threats are not ``cheap talk" but meaningful demonstrations of resolve. Aggregate patterns in these threats reveal information about North Korea's threat perceptions and predict subsequent, provocative behaviors. In this way, even low-level demonstrations of resolve can contribute to escalation. In sum, these studies suggest nuclear states' signals of resolve--rather than reassuring and deterring--can worsen the security environment.
Description
| Type of resource | text |
|---|---|
| Form | electronic resource; remote; computer; online resource |
| Extent | 1 online resource. |
| Place | California |
| Place | [Stanford, California] |
| Publisher | [Stanford University] |
| Copyright date | 2021; ©2021 |
| Publication date | 2021; 2021 |
| Issuance | monographic |
| Language | English |
Creators/Contributors
| Author | Sukin, Lauren Rachel |
|---|---|
| Degree supervisor | Sagan, Scott Douglas |
| Thesis advisor | Sagan, Scott Douglas |
| Thesis advisor | Schultz, Kenneth A |
| Thesis advisor | Tomz, Michael |
| Degree committee member | Schultz, Kenneth A |
| Degree committee member | Tomz, Michael |
| Associated with | Stanford University, Department of Political Science |
Subjects
| Genre | Theses |
|---|---|
| Genre | Text |
Bibliographic information
| Statement of responsibility | Lauren Sukin. |
|---|---|
| Note | Submitted to the Department of Political Science. |
| Thesis | Thesis Ph.D. Stanford University 2021. |
| Location | https://purl.stanford.edu/zx674sq5709 |
Access conditions
- Copyright
- © 2021 by Lauren Rachel Sukin
- License
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial No Derivatives 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC-ND).
Also listed in
Loading usage metrics...