Dynamic Banking with Non-Maturing Deposits

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Abstract/Contents

Abstract
Bank liabilities include debt with long-term maturities and deposits that typically are not withdrawn for extended periods. This subjects bank liabilities to debt dilution. Our analysis shows that this has major effects for how monetary policy shocks are transmitted to banks and for optimal capital regulation. Interest rate cuts produce protracted increases in bank risk which are stronger in low-rate regimes. Capital regulation addresses debt dilution but is subject to a time-inconsistency problem. We compare Ramsey and Markov-perfect optimal policies and find that regulator commitment significantly impacts optimal bank capital regulation, sometimes in unexpected ways.

Description

Type of resource text
Date created September 2, 2021

Creators/Contributors

Author Jermann, Urban
Author Xiang, Haotian
Organizer of meeting Begenau, Juliane
Organizer of meeting Hansen, Lars Peter
Organizer of meeting Hebert, Ben
Organizer of meeting Piazzesi, Monika

Subjects

Subject debt maturity
Subject dilution
Subject capital regulation
Subject monetary policy
Genre Text
Genre Working paper
Genre Grey literature

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User agrees that, where applicable, content will not be used to identify or to otherwise infringe the privacy or confidentiality rights of individuals. Content distributed via the Stanford Digital Repository may be subject to additional license and use restrictions applied by the depositor.
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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license (CC BY).

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Preferred citation
Jermann, U. and Xiang, H. (2022). Dynamic Banking with Non-Maturing Deposits. Stanford Digital Repository. Available at https://purl.stanford.edu/zw725tc4669

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