China’s “Gray Zone” Strategy in the South China Sea – A Discourse Analysis

The South China Sea contains one of the largest numbers of potential flashpoints for conflict in the world today. It is the arena for the changing dynamics of the global balance of power – the scene of China’s increasing assertion as a function of its rise and its effects on its neighbouring countries and the predominant power of the United States in the Indo-Pacific. The potential flashpoints are manifested in the conflicting claims to the resources and territory in the South China Sea between China, Taiwan and four Southeast Asian states – the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei. Furthermore, the long-standing presence of the US in the South China Sea (and by extension the Indo-Pacific), and certain Southeast Asian states’ support for it additionally fuels the potential for outbreak of hostilities in the disputed waters. Prominent clashes in the past decade between American naval ships conducting Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) and regional patrols/exercises and Chinese military and non-military vessels underscore the potential for conflict escalation in the region.

Nevertheless, given China’s spectacular economic growth over the past four decades as well as the impetus to solve its current domestic problems, it is unlikely that China would want to engage in a war with the US or the other Southeast Asian claimant states over the South China Sea. Yet, due to its desire to deny the US access to the South China Sea, and its economic interests in terms of securing fisheries and potential energy resources, China is seeking innovative means to assert its claims. These means are categorised mainly as “gray zone” strategies.

This research thesis aims to answer the question: Why is China pursuing a “gray zone” strategy in the South China Sea? This research question has two main parts. The first requires unpacking China’s primary motivation in the South China Sea. This thesis proposes two main categories of Chinese motivations – economic and geostrategic. Economic interests include securing fishing rights and the exploration of potential energy resources in the seabed. Geostrategic interests refer to China’s goal of removing its strategic vulnerabilities by denying the US access to the South China Sea. Although economic interests are critical, this thesis argues that geostrategic interests take primacy over economic interests in explaining China’s motivations in the South China Sea.

The second question focuses on China’s current usage of “gray zone” strategies to pursue its motivation. This thesis seeks to use discourse analysis to understand how Chinese analysts, and not only officials, conceptualise the “gray zone” tools they have at their disposal, and why they are inclined to use it to advance their maritime claims. To answer these questions, this thesis will analyse the 2015 and 2019 defence white papers, and Chinese analysts’ writings published in journals such as National Defence. Although Chinese official sources may be limited in that they are often censored by the government and may serve as propaganda to the Chinese and international public, they provide important insights and indicators for Chinese intentions and actions in the disputed waters. Instead of merely trying to pinpoint China’s “gray zone” tactics as challenging the existing international order, this thesis seeks to examine how China manoeuvres around existing international maritime legal constrains enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to assert their sovereign claims. It also seeks to demonstrate that the conceptualisation of such “gray zone” strategies is not entirely confined to within the Chinese government, but is also supported by the wider defence community in the country.