Essays on information transmission

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Abstract/Contents

Abstract
This dissertation comprises three essays in information economics. The central focus of this work is to study how the structure of the informational environment impacts the transmission of information and the resultant effects on outcomes and welfare. The first chapter of this dissertation introduces a new framework for modeling strategic information transmission in complex environments. We identify an equilibrium that is efficient and sender-optimal. The outcome is exactly what the sender would choose if she held full decision-making authority. This contrasts with the canonical simple environment of Crawford and Sobel (1982) in which equilibrium outcomes are inefficient and favor the receiver. The second chapter explores how an expert's ability to persuade changes with the availability of messages. We develop a geometric representation of the expert's payoff when using a limited number of messages. We identify bounds on the value of an additional signal for the sender. Moreover, we show that an additional signal does not directly translate into more information in equilibrium, and the receiver might prefer coarse communication. This suggests that regulations on communication capacity have the potential to shift the balance of power from the expert to the decision-maker, ultimately improving welfare. The third chapter deviates from the preceding two by focusing on non-strategic communication. In this chapter, we introduce a model in which homophily affects both the quality and diversity of the information to which people have access in their social networks. We characterize conditions under which homophily hurts rather than helps social learning. Homophily lowers efficiency and increases inequality in sparse networks but enhances efficiency and decreases inequality in dense enough networks. We also show that optimal (learning-maximizing) networks exhibit assortativity in payoff-determining characteristics, which results in incidental homophily on other innate characteristics, providing an explanation for some empirical patterns.

Description

Type of resource text
Form electronic resource; remote; computer; online resource
Extent 1 online resource.
Place California
Place [Stanford, California]
Publisher [Stanford University]
Copyright date 2024; ©2024
Publication date 2024; 2024
Issuance monographic
Language English

Creators/Contributors

Author Aybas, Yunus Can
Degree supervisor Callander, Steven
Degree supervisor Jackson, Matthew O
Thesis advisor Callander, Steven
Thesis advisor Jackson, Matthew O
Thesis advisor Wilson, Robert, 1937-
Degree committee member Wilson, Robert, 1937-
Associated with Stanford University, School of Humanities and Sciences
Associated with Stanford University, Department of Economics

Subjects

Genre Theses
Genre Text

Bibliographic information

Statement of responsibility Yunus C. Aybas.
Note Submitted to the Department of Economics.
Thesis Thesis Ph.D. Stanford University 2024.
Location https://purl.stanford.edu/zn549sj5895

Access conditions

Copyright
© 2024 by Yunus Can Aybas

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