Essays in corporate finance theory

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Abstract/Contents

Abstract: This dissertation consists of three pieces of research in theoretical corporate finance. The first one studies multi-agent design problems. Agents are concerned about each other's decisions and can communicate strategically with each other. The principal would like to motivate agents' participation decisions by affecting their communication. I employ such a multi-agent perspective on economic design to understand practices such as syndication. The second and the third ones take a more applied approach and study agency problems in specific corporate finance settings. They shed light on information design in corporate governance and dynamic interactions in special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs), respectively.

Type of resource	text
Form	electronic resource; remote; computer; online resource
Extent	1 online resource.
Place	California
Place	[Stanford, California]
Publisher	[Stanford University]
Copyright date	2022; ©2022
Publication date	2022; 2022
Issuance	monographic
Language	English

Author	Luo, Dan, (Researcher in corporate finance theory)
Degree supervisor	DeMarzo, Peter M
Degree supervisor	Zwiebel, Jeffrey
Thesis advisor	DeMarzo, Peter M
Thesis advisor	Zwiebel, Jeffrey
Thesis advisor	Hebert, Benjamin
Degree committee member	Hebert, Benjamin
Associated with	Stanford University, Graduate School of Business

Genre	Theses
Genre	Text

Statement of responsibility	Dan Luo.
Note	Submitted to the Graduate School of Business.
Thesis	Thesis Ph.D. Stanford University 2022.
Location	https://purl.stanford.edu/zg454fq4580

License: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).

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