Precaution in the private interest

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What determines how the regulation of risk changes over time? This dissertation develops and tests a theory to explain regulatory change at both national and international levels of governance. Beginning with the observation that the regulation of risk centers on a problem of asymmetric information between the regulator and the party being regulated, I proceed to elucidate how this informational asymmetry informs the regulatory institutions that are implemented, as well as the regulatory outcomes that result. In particular, I show how producers of potentially dangerous products leverage their informational advantages in order to acquire regulations that push their less profitable products off the market in favor of more profitable alternatives. Surprisingly, precautionary institutions intended to make regulatory standards more responsive to science and new information end up helping these producers use information to their advantage. Notably, because producers' ability to win favorable regulations results from their informational, as opposed to their political, influence, producers have been as successful at winning preferential regulatory outcomes at the international level as they have at the national one. My findings have implications for global welfare as well as for scholars' theoretical understanding of the conditions under which national and international bodies do and do not produce divergent outcomes.


Type of resource text
Form electronic resource; remote; computer; online resource
Extent 1 online resource.
Place California
Place [Stanford, California]
Publisher [Stanford University]
Copyright date 2019; ©2019
Publication date 2019; 2019
Issuance monographic
Language English


Author Perlman, Rebecca Louise
Degree supervisor Goldstein, Judith
Thesis advisor Goldstein, Judith
Thesis advisor Haber, Stephen H, 1957-
Thesis advisor Moe, Terry
Thesis advisor Tomz, Michael
Degree committee member Haber, Stephen H, 1957-
Degree committee member Moe, Terry
Degree committee member Tomz, Michael
Associated with Stanford University, Department of Political Science


Genre Theses
Genre Text

Bibliographic information

Statement of responsibility Rebecca Perlman.
Note Submitted to the Department of Political Science.
Thesis Thesis Ph.D. Stanford University 2019.

Access conditions

© 2019 by Rebecca Louise Perlman
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).

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