Essays in corporate finance : financial contracts and their implications
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- Chapter 1 studies the joint design of optimal incentive pay and information disclosure in a dynamic moral hazard problem. The principal is more informed about the outcomes of agent's actions and actively manages information available to the agent. Sharing information with the agent increases productivity (for example, allowing a better allocation of resources or effort), but increases the cost of providing incentives. The optimal contract features incomplete information sharing with positive information shared more than negative information and past negative information leading to less information sharing in the future. Chapter 2 explores the role of short-term debt in the financial crisis. We analyze a novel data set of repurchase agreements (repo), that is, loans between non-bank cash lenders and dealer banks collateralized with securities. Consistent with a run, repo volume backed by private asset-backed securities falls to near zero in the crisis. However, the reduction is only $182 billion, which is small relative to the stock of private asset-backed securities as well as the contraction in asset-backed commercial paper. While the repo contraction is small in aggregate, it disproportionately a↵ected a few dealer banks.
Description
Type of resource | text |
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Form | electronic; electronic resource; remote |
Extent | 1 online resource. |
Publication date | 2014 |
Issuance | monographic |
Language | English |
Creators/Contributors
Associated with | Orlov, Dmitry |
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Associated with | Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. |
Primary advisor | Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 1973- |
Primary advisor | Zwiebel, Jeffrey |
Thesis advisor | Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 1973- |
Thesis advisor | Zwiebel, Jeffrey |
Thesis advisor | DeMarzo, Peter M |
Thesis advisor | Koudijs, Peter |
Advisor | DeMarzo, Peter M |
Advisor | Koudijs, Peter |
Subjects
Genre | Theses |
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Bibliographic information
Statement of responsibility | Dmitry Orlov. |
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Note | Submitted to the Graduate School of Business. |
Thesis | Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2014. |
Location | electronic resource |
Access conditions
- Copyright
- © 2014 by Dmitry Orlov
- License
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).
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