Essays on market design
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- This thesis consists of four essays on mechanism and market design. The first essay studies mechanism design in dynamic environments and establishes a sufficient condition for full surplus extraction and implementation. The second essay studies information acquisition in a matching problem and considers optimal information design. The third and fourth essays study the matching size in the assignment problems. The third essay characterizes the upperbound of the matching size achieved by the random serial dictatorship mechanism. The fourth essay shows that (i) the standard mechanism fails to achieve a large matching size when we have generalized constraints on the set of feasible matchings, and (ii) the alternative mechanism we propose always generate a large matching.
Description
| Type of resource | text |
|---|---|
| Form | electronic resource; remote; computer; online resource |
| Extent | 1 online resource. |
| Place | California |
| Place | [Stanford, California] |
| Publisher | [Stanford University] |
| Copyright date | 2019; ©2019 |
| Publication date | 2019; 2019 |
| Issuance | monographic |
| Language | English |
Creators/Contributors
| Author | Noda, Shunya |
|---|---|
| Degree supervisor | Kojima, Fuhito |
| Thesis advisor | Kojima, Fuhito |
| Thesis advisor | Ashlagi, Itai |
| Thesis advisor | Carroll, Gabriel |
| Degree committee member | Ashlagi, Itai |
| Degree committee member | Carroll, Gabriel |
| Associated with | Stanford University, Department of Economics. |
Subjects
| Genre | Theses |
|---|---|
| Genre | Text |
Bibliographic information
| Statement of responsibility | Shunya Noda. |
|---|---|
| Note | Submitted to the Department of Economics. |
| Thesis | Thesis Ph.D. Stanford University 2019. |
| Location | electronic resource |
Access conditions
- Copyright
- © 2019 by Shunya Noda
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