Essays on market design

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Abstract/Contents

Abstract
This thesis consists of four essays on mechanism and market design. The first essay studies mechanism design in dynamic environments and establishes a sufficient condition for full surplus extraction and implementation. The second essay studies information acquisition in a matching problem and considers optimal information design. The third and fourth essays study the matching size in the assignment problems. The third essay characterizes the upperbound of the matching size achieved by the random serial dictatorship mechanism. The fourth essay shows that (i) the standard mechanism fails to achieve a large matching size when we have generalized constraints on the set of feasible matchings, and (ii) the alternative mechanism we propose always generate a large matching.

Description

Type of resource text
Form electronic resource; remote; computer; online resource
Extent 1 online resource.
Place California
Place [Stanford, California]
Publisher [Stanford University]
Copyright date 2019; ©2019
Publication date 2019; 2019
Issuance monographic
Language English

Creators/Contributors

Author Noda, Shunya
Degree supervisor Kojima, Fuhito
Thesis advisor Kojima, Fuhito
Thesis advisor Ashlagi, Itai
Thesis advisor Carroll, Gabriel
Degree committee member Ashlagi, Itai
Degree committee member Carroll, Gabriel
Associated with Stanford University, Department of Economics.

Subjects

Genre Theses
Genre Text

Bibliographic information

Statement of responsibility Shunya Noda.
Note Submitted to the Department of Economics.
Thesis Thesis Ph.D. Stanford University 2019.
Location electronic resource

Access conditions

Copyright
© 2019 by Shunya Noda

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