Deciphering the implications of state-sponsored cyber operations for IR theory
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- This dissertation seeks to understand to what extent state-sponsored cyber operations should motivate revisions in traditional international relations theory. In Chapter 2, I test the applicability of existing theories of state conflict initiation and foreign policy on the cyber domain. I find that democracies are no less likely than autocracies to initiate a cyber operation in a given year, although they initiate with less frequency. Heterogeneity among authoritarian regime types exists; however, contrary to theories of traditional conflict initiation, personalism is not significant. These findings provide suggestive evidence that institutional mechanisms of conflict initiation and foreign policy do not restrain cyber initiation in the same way they have been theorized to restrain conventional conflict. Chapter 3 is a co-authored paper that utilizes a survey experiment to test whether the public support for retaliation is distinct in response to cyber and kinetic operations. We argue that certain characteristics, namely attribution certainty, timing, and perceived intentionality of harm, may account for the public's distinct attitudes to cyber operations. Finally, in Chapter 4, I advance the literature by arguing against a narrow focus on the impacts of the attribution problem, and I contribute to the development of a common taxonomy for target state communication of cyber operations. I argue that the attribution problem provides the target state increased agency in deciding when, and to what extent, to communicate cyber operations. This discretion allows states flexibility in their response and provides greater control over escalation and domestic political costs at the expense of deterrence by punishment. Taken together, these papers demonstrate how the clandestine and covert nature of cyber operations has implications for the domestic political costs and, subsequently, considerations for the initiation and response to cyber operations.
Description
| Type of resource | text |
|---|---|
| Form | electronic resource; remote; computer; online resource |
| Extent | 1 online resource. |
| Place | California |
| Place | [Stanford, California] |
| Publisher | [Stanford University] |
| Copyright date | 2021; ©2021 |
| Publication date | 2021; 2021 |
| Issuance | monographic |
| Language | English |
Creators/Contributors
| Author | Hedgecock, Kathryn Jayne |
|---|---|
| Degree supervisor | Sagan, Scott Douglas |
| Thesis advisor | Sagan, Scott Douglas |
| Thesis advisor | Schultz, Kenneth A |
| Thesis advisor | Tomz, Michael |
| Degree committee member | Schultz, Kenneth A |
| Degree committee member | Tomz, Michael |
| Associated with | Stanford University, Department of Political Science |
Subjects
| Genre | Theses |
|---|---|
| Genre | Text |
Bibliographic information
| Statement of responsibility | Kathryn Jayne Hedgecock. |
|---|---|
| Note | Submitted to the Department of Political Science. |
| Thesis | Thesis Ph.D. Stanford University 2021. |
| Location | https://purl.stanford.edu/yj410vw9056 |
Access conditions
- Copyright
- © 2021 by Kathryn Jayne Hedgecock
- License
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).
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