Capital Commitment

Placeholder Show Content

Abstract/Contents

Abstract
Ten trillion dollars are allocated to illiquid vehicles for which investors commit ex-ante to transferring capital on demand – most of which are Private Equity (PE) funds. We design a dynamic portfolio allocation model in which investors commit capital to PE. The effects of commitment risk on investors’ portfolios and welfare are large. Investors are under-allocated to PE, and willing to pay a premium to update their PE allocation when capital is called, which is more than twice the one to eliminate standard liquidity frictions induced by the limited tradability of PE. In contrast, investors are not willing to pay to remove the uncertainty over the timing of capital call.

Description

Type of resource text
Date created July 29, 2021

Creators/Contributors

Author Gourier, Elise
Author Phalippou, Ludovic
Author Westerfield, Mark M.
Organizer of meeting Judd, Kenneth
Organizer of meeting Pohl, Walter
Organizer of meeting Schmedders, Karl
Organizer of meeting Wilms, Ole

Subjects

Subject capital commitment
Subject private equity
Subject liquidity cost
Genre Text
Genre Working paper
Genre Grey literature

Bibliographic information

Access conditions

Use and reproduction
User agrees that, where applicable, content will not be used to identify or to otherwise infringe the privacy or confidentiality rights of individuals. Content distributed via the Stanford Digital Repository may be subject to additional license and use restrictions applied by the depositor.
License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license (CC BY).

Preferred citation

Preferred citation
Gourier, E., Phalippou, L., and Westerfield, M. (2022). Capital Commitment. Stanford Digital Repository. Available at https://purl.stanford.edu/yf333xh1687

Collection

Contact information

Also listed in

Loading usage metrics...