Reasonable disagreement : liberal citizens and epistemic peers
- Reasonable people disagree. Political liberalism claims that the fact of reasonable disagreement has major implications for political justification: important political decisions should not be based on considerations that are reasonably disputed. Recent discussions in epistemology focus on whether reasonable disagreement undermines the justification of our controversial beliefs. My dissertation brings these political and epistemological issues together. I argue for a new position on the epistemology of disagreement, and show that this position, together with the correct understanding of liberal citizenship, leads to a skeptical challenge to political liberalism. The challenge is that the requirements of liberal citizenship are in tension with justified religious, moral, and philosophical belief. In answer to this challenge, I explore the strategy of thinking about people's fundamental convictions in terms of acceptance rather than belief.
|Type of resource
|electronic; electronic resource; remote
|1 online resource.
|van Wietmarschen, Han
|Stanford University, Department of Philosophy.
|Statement of responsibility
|Han van Wietmarschen.
|Submitted to the Department of Philosophy.
|Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2013.
- © 2013 by Johannes Gerardus van Wietmarschen
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).
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