Reasonable disagreement : liberal citizens and epistemic peers

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Reasonable people disagree. Political liberalism claims that the fact of reasonable disagreement has major implications for political justification: important political decisions should not be based on considerations that are reasonably disputed. Recent discussions in epistemology focus on whether reasonable disagreement undermines the justification of our controversial beliefs. My dissertation brings these political and epistemological issues together. I argue for a new position on the epistemology of disagreement, and show that this position, together with the correct understanding of liberal citizenship, leads to a skeptical challenge to political liberalism. The challenge is that the requirements of liberal citizenship are in tension with justified religious, moral, and philosophical belief. In answer to this challenge, I explore the strategy of thinking about people's fundamental convictions in terms of acceptance rather than belief.


Type of resource text
Form electronic; electronic resource; remote
Extent 1 online resource.
Publication date 2013
Issuance monographic
Language English


Associated with van Wietmarschen, Han
Associated with Stanford University, Department of Philosophy.
Primary advisor Bratman, Michael
Thesis advisor Bratman, Michael
Thesis advisor Cohen, Joshua
Thesis advisor Lawlor, Krista
Advisor Cohen, Joshua
Advisor Lawlor, Krista


Genre Theses

Bibliographic information

Statement of responsibility Han van Wietmarschen.
Note Submitted to the Department of Philosophy.
Thesis Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2013.
Location electronic resource

Access conditions

© 2013 by Johannes Gerardus van Wietmarschen
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).

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