The proliferation of state and local elections in the United States, 1776-1900

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Abstract/Contents

Abstract
Circa 1787, Americans elected very few state and local officials. Yet, by 1950 they elected far more such officials than any other country. This dissertation presents original data on the nineteenth century reforms that proliferated public offices at the state and county levels. To explain this historical sea change, I present a model of a bargaining problem, faced by all governments, in which leaders must simultaneously fill public offices and fully fund the government's budget. Applying the model to the early American states, I argue that the growth of elective offices at the state and county levels stemmed from elite fears that unitary executive power would fall into the hands of the newly-enfranchised poor. Thus, the main driver of office proliferation was neither Jacksonian Democrats' desire to expand spoils, nor western states' desire to attract labor. I support my thesis mainly using difference-in-difference analyses that compare the timing of "electoralization" to the timing of suffrage expansion from 1776 to 1900.

Description

Type of resource text
Form electronic resource; remote; computer; online resource
Extent 1 online resource.
Place California
Place [Stanford, California]
Publisher [Stanford University]
Copyright date 2020; ©2020
Publication date 2020; 2020
Issuance monographic
Language English

Creators/Contributors

Author DeHart, Cameron Gregory
Degree supervisor Cox, Gary W
Thesis advisor Cox, Gary W
Thesis advisor Brady, David W
Thesis advisor Cain, Bruce E
Degree committee member Brady, David W
Degree committee member Cain, Bruce E
Associated with Stanford University, Department of Political Science.

Subjects

Genre Theses
Genre Text

Bibliographic information

Statement of responsibility Cameron DeHart.
Note Submitted to the Department of Political Science.
Thesis Thesis Ph.D. Stanford University 2020.
Location electronic resource

Access conditions

Copyright
© 2020 by Cameron Gregory DeHart
License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported license (CC BY).

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