Laboratories of Secrecy: Why Some U.S. States Have Sold Their Sovereignty to Criminals and Kleptocrats.

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Abstract/Contents

Abstract
Despite its reputation for the toughest anti-money laundering (AML) enforcement in the world, the United States remains the leading jurisdiction for the incorporation of anonymous shell companies used in grand corruption schemes. States like Delaware and Nevada have become notorious secrecy jurisdictions, frequently used by criminals and kleptocrats for money laundering. This thesis investigates why some U.S. states and not others have become the most secretive incorporation jurisdictions in the world. By employing the metrics from corporate secrecy scholars and NGOs and never-before-collected cross-sectional data on U.S. state incorporation fee revenue, this work reveals the correlates of U.S. state corporate secrecy. Moreover, through an interest group analysis of the corporate policymaking of two states (Delaware and Nevada) it posits a causal logic behind corporate secrecy in the most secretive U.S. states. It highlights how pro-secrecy interests in the United States have gained control over incorporation policymaking in Delaware and Nevada.

Description

Type of resource text
Date created May 22, 2020

Creators/Contributors

Author Tuttle, Bryce
Degree granting institution Stanford University, Fisher Family Honors Program in Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law
Primary advisor Diamond, Larry

Subjects

Subject shell companies
Subject money laundering
Subject corporate service provider
Subject csp
Subject aml
Subject kleptocrats
Subject kleptocracy
Subject Delaware
Subject Nevada
Subject interest groups
Subject corruption
Subject federalism
Subject state politics
Subject secrecy jurisdiction
Subject tax haven
Subject financial secrecy
Subject incorporation
Subject race to the bottom
Subject bar association
Subject financial crime
Subject offshore financial center
Subject ofc
Subject compliance
Subject financial intelligence
Subject state capture
Subject bureaucratic capture
Subject capture
Subject Center on Development Democracy and Rule of Law
Subject CDDRL
Genre Thesis

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User agrees that, where applicable, content will not be used to identify or to otherwise infringe the privacy or confidentiality rights of individuals. Content distributed via the Stanford Digital Repository may be subject to additional license and use restrictions applied by the depositor.
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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).

Preferred citation

Preferred Citation
Tuttle, Bryce and Diamond, Larry. (2020). Laboratories of Secrecy: Why Some U.S. States Have Sold Their Sovereignty to Criminals and Kleptocrats. Stanford Digital Repository. Available at: https://purl.stanford.edu/xw425vm9024.

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Stanford University, Fisher Family Honors Program in Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law. (CDDRL)

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