The Ambiguity of Nuclear Commitments
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- Since the 1950’s, the United States has engaged in nuclear sharing with its NATO allies. However, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon states. Thus, there has been a debate over the effect of nuclear sharing on the NPT. This thesis finds that nuclear sharing originally strengthened the NPT by discouraging proliferation by West Germany. However, U.S. efforts to preserve NATO’s pre-existing arrangements produced ambiguity in Articles I and II. This ambiguity has since limited the scope of debates over the legality of nuclear sharing at NPT Review Conferences. However, the potential release of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to NATO allies constitutes the main source of contention between NATO and the NAM in these debates. Security reasons for keeping the weapons are tenuous: their presence is not necessary to discourage Turkey from developing nuclear weapons if Iran acquires them and their role in reassuring Eastern European NATO allies and deterring Russia is limited. Moreover, there are major flaws in relying on the weapons for reassurance and extended deterrence against Russian threats to cyber security, energy security, and political stability. The implication of this thesis is that NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements undermine the NPT by setting a precedent for other countries to engage in similar practices and hindering Turkey’s goal of building a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East. Projecting forward, the U.S. could explore alternative avenues for reassuring its NATO allies and negotiate reciprocal reductions in tactical nuclear weapons with Russia.
Description
| Type of resource | text |
|---|---|
| Date created | 2013 |
Creators/Contributors
| Author | Khalessi, Daniel |
|---|---|
| Advisor | Sagan, Scott D. |
Subjects
| Subject | CISAC |
|---|---|
| Subject | Center for International Security and Cooperation |
| Subject | Stanford University |
| Subject | nonproliferation |
| Subject | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| Subject | nuclear sharing |
| Subject | Firestone Medal Award |
| Genre | Thesis |
Bibliographic information
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- User agrees that, where applicable, content will not be used to identify or to otherwise infringe the privacy or confidentiality rights of individuals. Content distributed via the Stanford Digital Repository may be subject to additional license and use restrictions applied by the depositor.
- License
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).
Preferred citation
- Preferred Citation
- Khalessi, Daniel. (2013). The Ambiguity of Nuclear Commitments. Stanford Digital Repository. Available at: http://purl.stanford.edu/xv821ky9700
Collection
Stanford University, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Interschool Honors Program in International Security Studies, Theses
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