Compulsory Licensing and Domestic Innovation: Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act after World War II
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- Compulsory licensing allows countries to produce patented foreign innovations without the consent of the foreign patent holders. During World War I and World War II, the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) allowed the United States to vest all enemy-owned patents. The Alien Property Custodian systematically licensed the vested patents to U.S. firms. Moser and Voena (2010) found that compulsory licensing under the World War I TWEA increased U.S. domestic innovation by a minimum of 20 percent. My paper extends their analysis by examining how compulsory licensing under the World War II TWEA affected U.S. domestic innovation. During World War II, patents originally owned by Germany, Japan, and Italy were licensed to U.S firms. Did U.S. inventors face less economic incentive to produce domestic innovation because they could cheaply use foreign innovation after paying a low licensing fee? Or did compulsory licensing encourage domestic innovation (Moser and Voena, 2010)? For example, experience with producing foreign innovations could have encouraged the learning-by-doing of the compulsory licensees (Moser and Voena, 2010). To the extent that technologies were differently affected by the World War II TWEA, I use a difference-in-differences strategy to examine the effects of compulsory licensing on domestic innovation. My analysis provides evidence that compulsory licensing under the World War II TWEA had positive effects on domestic innovation activities.
Description
Type of resource | text |
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Date created | May 2011 |
Creators/Contributors
Author | Lee, Stephanie | |
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Primary advisor | Moser, Petra | |
Degree granting institution | Stanford University, Department of Economics |
Subjects
Subject | Stanford Department of Economics |
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Subject | Alien Property Custodian |
Subject | patent law |
Subject | innovation |
Subject | invention |
Subject | learning-by-doing |
Subject | Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) |
Genre | Thesis |
Bibliographic information
Related item | |
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Location | https://purl.stanford.edu/xm378ff8816 |
Access conditions
- Use and reproduction
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Preferred citation
- Preferred Citation
- Lee, Stephanie. (2011). Compulsory Licensing and Domestic Innovation: Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act after World War II. Stanford Digital Repository. Available at: https://purl.stanford.edu/xm378ff8816
Collection
Stanford University, Department of Economics, Honors Theses
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