Compulsory Licensing and Domestic Innovation: Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act after World War II

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Abstract/Contents

Abstract
Compulsory licensing allows countries to produce patented foreign innovations without the consent of the foreign patent holders. During World War I and World War II, the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) allowed the United States to vest all enemy-owned patents. The Alien Property Custodian systematically licensed the vested patents to U.S. firms. Moser and Voena (2010) found that compulsory licensing under the World War I TWEA increased U.S. domestic innovation by a minimum of 20 percent. My paper extends their analysis by examining how compulsory licensing under the World War II TWEA affected U.S. domestic innovation. During World War II, patents originally owned by Germany, Japan, and Italy were licensed to U.S firms. Did U.S. inventors face less economic incentive to produce domestic innovation because they could cheaply use foreign innovation after paying a low licensing fee? Or did compulsory licensing encourage domestic innovation (Moser and Voena, 2010)? For example, experience with producing foreign innovations could have encouraged the learning-by-doing of the compulsory licensees (Moser and Voena, 2010). To the extent that technologies were differently affected by the World War II TWEA, I use a difference-in-differences strategy to examine the effects of compulsory licensing on domestic innovation. My analysis provides evidence that compulsory licensing under the World War II TWEA had positive effects on domestic innovation activities.

Description

Type of resource text
Date created May 2011

Creators/Contributors

Author Lee, Stephanie
Primary advisor Moser, Petra
Degree granting institution Stanford University, Department of Economics

Subjects

Subject Stanford Department of Economics
Subject Alien Property Custodian
Subject patent law
Subject innovation
Subject invention
Subject learning-by-doing
Subject Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
Genre Thesis

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Preferred Citation
Lee, Stephanie. (2011). Compulsory Licensing and Domestic Innovation: Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act after World War II. Stanford Digital Repository. Available at: https://purl.stanford.edu/xm378ff8816

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Stanford University, Department of Economics, Honors Theses

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