Guns, Germs, And Alleles: Analyzing Lone Insider Bioweapons Threats
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- Prior to the 21st century, biological weapons were considered largely the purview of state bioweapons programs. As the life sciences quickly advanced into the 2000s, including an exponential drop in the cost of DNA sequencing and synthesis, there was increasing concern that weaponizing pathogens may become within reach for non-state actors. The ability to synthesize whole viruses, first demonstrated in 2002, stoked concern that scientists could synthesize agents with pandemic potential that could be used in a mass-casualty attack. Lone insiders in biological laboratories, who have technical training and access to laboratory equipment, were considered a particular threat. Despite these concerns, why have no mass-casualty attacks using pathogens been perpetrated by lone insiders? This thesis considers two factors: the historical capabilities of lone insiders to acquire pandemic potential viruses, and their motivations to perpetrate mass-casualty attacks. First, I show that the malicious acts historically perpetrated by lone insiders are bio-crimes rather than bioterrorist acts, and therefore largely not intent on inflicting mass casualties. Conversely, transnational groups that may have this intent have not sought to recruit insiders in biological laboratories. However, professional and financial gain can be powerful motivators for lone insiders and may still lead to event that can incur large-scale harm. Second, drawing on bibliometric data from synthetic virology papers, I argue that the historical threshold for capability required to synthesize viruses has been prohibitory to those who were not early adopters or innovators in the field synthetic virology, and so there is a small pool of concerning actors that make such attacks less likely, although this is changing as capabilities rapidly diffuse. By more fully understanding the threat of mass-casualty attacks posed by lone insiders and developing better indicators of rapidly changing capabilities, policy makers and research institutions can work to assess this threat and position themselves to prevent and prepare for biological threats.
Description
| Type of resource | text |
|---|---|
| Date created | June 4, 2020 |
Creators/Contributors
| Author | Frankel, Eva |
|---|---|
| Primary advisor | Stearns, Tim |
| Advisor | Palmer, Megan J. |
| Degree granting institution | Stanford University, Center for International Security and Cooperation |
Subjects
| Subject | Center for International Security and Cooperation |
|---|---|
| Subject | bioterrorism |
| Subject | lone insider threats |
| Genre | Thesis |
Bibliographic information
Access conditions
- Use and reproduction
- User agrees that, where applicable, content will not be used to identify or to otherwise infringe the privacy or confidentiality rights of individuals. Content distributed via the Stanford Digital Repository may be subject to additional license and use restrictions applied by the depositor.
- License
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).
Preferred citation
- Preferred Citation
- Frankel, Eva and Stearns, Tim and Palmer, Megan J.. (2020). Guns, Germs, And Alleles: Analyzing Lone Insider Bioweapons Threats. Stanford Digital Repository. Available at: https://purl.stanford.edu/wz249wf1294
Collection
Stanford University, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Interschool Honors Program in International Security Studies, Theses
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- Contact
- e.frankel8@gmail.com
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