International Scientific Engagement for Mitigating Emerging Nuclear Security Threats

The threat of nuclear weapons is ever present in today’s international security landscape. Aspiring proliferators such as Iran and recent proliferators such as North Korea pose a grave threat to the integrity of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Moreover, developed nations worry that new proliferators may allow nuclear weapons to fall into the hands of terrorists or other non-state actors.

The threat posed by nuclear weapons is so great, that it merits a more complete discussion of potential techniques and strategies to avoid nuclear conflict. In recent months, even the Bush administration— notorious for its reliance on gunboat diplomacy and its skepticism of arms control agreements —has begun to explore diplomatic and other means to deal
with potential proliferators.2 Hecker and his colleagues were engaging with North Korean scientists and diplomats in an unofficial capacity. This constitutes one aspect of a strategy to mitigate the threat of nuclear weapons. The role of the scientific security community, of which Hecker is apart of, is often overlooked. Nonetheless, during much of the Cold
War scientists of mutually hostile nations have indeed worked together and made crucial contributions to easing tensions, promoting arms control agreements and mitigating the threat of nuclear war.

During the Cold War, scientists from both sides of the iron curtain engaged in a transna-tional dialogue to address the perils of nuclear conflict. Through personal connections, conferences such as Pugwash and inter-academy programs, these scientists worked to foster transparency, alleviate tensions, and explore potential agreements between their governments for arms control and arms reduction. This group of security-minded scientists introduced norms and ideas and gained access to key policy-makers in the U.S. and Soviet Union. In some instances, the international group of scientists were able to influence international policies where government officials and diplomats had failed.

A better understanding of the actions of these scientists will provide insights into creating effective strategies for Hecker and other like-minded scientists who are working on today’s international nuclear conflicts. Fundamentally, this thesis looks to the scientists of the past for inspiration in better managing nuclear security threats of the present.