Measuring political connections in Brazil

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Abstract/Contents

Abstract
This paper investigates the returns of contributions to electoral campaigns on the market value of firms. The hypothesis is that contributing to a federal representative or senator leads to higher stock returns for the firms that made these contributions. I implement an event study strategy using data from the Supreme Electoral Court on campaign contributions and from the São Paulo Stock Exchange on historical prices to test my hypothesis. I find some evidence that firms that contribute to campaign winners have returns higher than one would expect right after the election. The intensity of this impact seems to be influenced by how much a firm contributed to campaign winners and by how many campaign winners a firm contributed to.

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Type of resource text
Date created June 5, 2019

Creators/Contributors

Author Crisóstomo Wainstock, Daniel
Degree granting institution Stanford University, Department of Economics
Primary advisor Dupas, Pascaline

Subjects

Subject Department of Economics
Subject Brazil
Subject political connections
Subject campaign finance
Genre Thesis

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User agrees that, where applicable, content will not be used to identify or to otherwise infringe the privacy or confidentiality rights of individuals. Content distributed via the Stanford Digital Repository may be subject to additional license and use restrictions applied by the depositor.
License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).

Preferred citation

Preferred Citation
Crisóstomo Wainstock, Daniel. (2019). Measuring political connections in Brazil. Stanford Digital Repository. Available at: https://purl.stanford.edu/ww819vx0328

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Stanford University, Department of Economics, Honors Theses

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