Counting the Czars: Extra-Bureaucratic Appointees in American Foreign Policy
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- Though the term “White House Czar” has been frequently used in popular media to refer to any high-level executive branch official created outside the regular bureaucracy, the title has rarely been treated with analytic precision, nor connected to the broader literature on presidential power. “Czars” have now been part of the American political system for a century. However, there has been little scholarship seeking to explain when and why presidents resort to them, particularly in foreign affairs. This thesis seeks to fill the gap, examining three potential factors that could explain the patterns of czar creation over the past hundred years: presidential management style, opposition party control of the Senate (divided government), and the external threat environment that presidents confront. I find that while a competitive management style does potentially increase the number of czars a president appoints, there exists little evidence that divided government drives a president to work outside the standard bureaucratic process. I also find that the specific cause that drives czar proliferation more than any other is fighting simultaneous wars, as was the case during World War Two and after 9/11. This finding suggests that President Trump and his successors will utilize these extra- bureaucratic appointments to implement foreign policy primarily based on their management style and the nature of the problems they encounter, regardless of congressional opposition. It also suggests that further research should be conducted to explore the efficacy of these czars, as they are likely to remain a source of controversy and influence well into the future.
Description
| Type of resource | text |
|---|---|
| Date created | May 24, 2017 |
Creators/Contributors
| Author | Weller, Jack |
|---|---|
| Primary advisor | Zegart, Amy |
Subjects
| Subject | Center for International Security and Cooperation |
|---|---|
| Subject | bureaucratic politics |
| Subject | the presidency |
| Subject | foreign policy |
| Genre | Thesis |
Bibliographic information
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- User agrees that, where applicable, content will not be used to identify or to otherwise infringe the privacy or confidentiality rights of individuals. Content distributed via the Stanford Digital Repository may be subject to additional license and use restrictions applied by the depositor.
- License
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).
Preferred citation
- Preferred Citation
- Weller, Jack. (2017). Counting the Czars: Extra-Bureaucratic Appointees in American Foreign Policy. Stanford Digital Repository. Available at: http://purl.stanford.edu/wv887bc1247
Collection
Stanford University, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Interschool Honors Program in International Security Studies, Theses
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- Contact
- jsweller@stanford.edu
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