On the Highly Dubious Intrinsic Moral Value of Human Suffering: Retribution and the Fourth Great Ape

The question that must be answered – and the question that to which two different answers are given – is this: are human actions influenced by factors outside of the actor’s control in a way that mitigates moral culpability? In other words, can the physical, psychological, and social circumstances surrounding a human action render that human morally inculpable? In summary, there are two incompatible belief frameworks contained within United State criminal justice legislation. Diminished responsibility relies on mind-body supervenience, in which the mind is necessarily affected by the physical circumstances of the brain— such as psychology, biology, and sociology. Ordinary criminal punishment, however, relies on a view of the mind-body connection that does not allow for moral culpability to be mitigated by physical circumstances – mind-body independence. Both of these views
cannot be incorporated into a single coherent framework. Empirical evidence indicates that external factors significantly affect human behavior. Given this, we should view all criminals as being subject to a diminished moral responsibility. In current law, those with diminished responsibility are not punished retributively. Thus we should eliminate retribution as a justification for all cases of criminal punishment.