When governments lobby
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- What happens when governments hire lobbyists? In the U.S., governments are among the most active lobbying groups. Local governments frequently lobby their state capitols, and both state and local officials lobby the federal government. But despite the ubiquity of intergovernmental lobbying, we lack systematic evidence about the conditions under which local governments lobby and the effects of this behavior on public policy. This book begins to answer these questions. Marshaling original quantitative and qualitative evidence from dozens of sources---including newly compiled longitudinal data on lobbying disclosures in all 50 states---I argue that intergovernmental lobbying allows local governments to purchase advocacy when their needs are not met through formal channels of representation. While this ability to pay for representation can help local officials communicate their needs to the state government, it also raises equity concerns. In this volume, I demonstrate that affluent municipalities are more likely to lobby and experience greater monetary returns when they do. One of the empirical puzzles in the literature on federalism is that wealthy areas often secure more funding from the central government, even when transfer systems are designed to redistribute revenue to less advantaged regions. My results suggest that one reason why states have been so ineffective at reducing local revenue inequality is because rich cities are able to translate their economic advantage into political power through lobbying.
Description
| Type of resource | text |
|---|---|
| Form | electronic; electronic resource; remote |
| Extent | 1 online resource. |
| Publication date | 2017 |
| Issuance | monographic |
| Language | English |
Creators/Contributors
| Associated with | Payson, Julia A |
|---|---|
| Associated with | Stanford University, Department of Political Science. |
| Primary advisor | Moe, Terry M |
| Thesis advisor | Moe, Terry M |
| Thesis advisor | Cain, Bruce E |
| Thesis advisor | Hall, Andy |
| Thesis advisor | Nall, Clayton |
| Advisor | Cain, Bruce E |
| Advisor | Hall, Andy |
| Advisor | Nall, Clayton |
Subjects
| Genre | Theses |
|---|
Bibliographic information
| Statement of responsibility | Julia A. Payson. |
|---|---|
| Note | Submitted to the Department of Political Science. |
| Thesis | Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2017. |
| Location | electronic resource |
Access conditions
- Copyright
- © 2017 by Julia Ann Payson
- License
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).
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