Buying suits : exploring business-to-business financing of American disputes
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- People litigate for various reasons. Some want to right wrongs, others -- make precedents. But most, at least in the civil realm, sue to protect economic interests; and they are motivated by pragmatic considerations rather than abstract notions of justice. One fruit of the mercantile approach to civil litigation is the nascent market where third parties provide financing for litigants (or their lawyers) and profit from a successful resolution of the funded claims. Through the lens of a third-party funder, justice is a mass-market commodity, and its value depends on laws of men and laws of probability alike. The ways of litigation funders create multiple points of tension for the legal process and its participants, and laws on the book offer little guidance on how third-party interests should be treated. Resulting procedural and ethical dilemmas have stirred a debate among scholars who rushed to offer conflicting opinions and advice. Critics demand that litigation investing be banned, calling it a travesty of justice that turns courts into casinos. Enthusiasts want the practice formally recognized, asserting that it levels the playing field for weaker parties. The discussion on litigation financing does not lack vigor; but it does lack hard facts. Drawing from first-hand empirical data on the practice of litigation funding in the United States, this thesis explores and systematizes the market for legal claims, explaining how it actually works. First, it describes the entire ecosystem of actors who apply the logic of asset management to uncertainties of individual lawsuits. Second, it tackles the question of why commercial disputes get funded. Third, it provides a systematic overview of different models of financing, from secured debt to equity-style investments to attorney's fee-backed securities. Finally, it contemplates funding in the context of complex litigation, and shows various ways used by litigation stakeholders to leverage their resources. Based on the descriptive findings, I claim that modern civil litigation engages multiple, often undisclosed stakeholders with complex financial motivations. I argue that such interests should be recognized by the legal system as legitimate and ultimately regulated.
Description
| Type of resource | text |
|---|---|
| Form | electronic; electronic resource; remote |
| Extent | 1 online resource. |
| Publication date | 2014 |
| Issuance | monographic |
| Language | English |
Creators/Contributors
| Associated with | Goral, Radoslaw |
|---|---|
| Associated with | Stanford University, School of Law JSD. |
| Primary advisor | Hensler, Deborah R, 1942- |
| Thesis advisor | Hensler, Deborah R, 1942- |
| Thesis advisor | Gilson, Ronald J, 1946- |
| Thesis advisor | Grundfest, Joseph A |
| Advisor | Gilson, Ronald J, 1946- |
| Advisor | Grundfest, Joseph A |
Subjects
| Genre | Theses |
|---|
Bibliographic information
| Statement of responsibility | Radoslaw Goral. |
|---|---|
| Note | Submitted to the School of Law JSD. |
| Thesis | Thesis (JSD)--Stanford University, 2014. |
| Location | electronic resource |
Access conditions
- Copyright
- © 2014 by Radoslaw Goral
- License
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).
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