Why High Incentives Cause Repugnance: A Framed Field Experiment
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- A key feature of markets for repugnant transactions is that certain transactions seem to raise moral concerns only when they involve high monetary incentives. Using a framed field experiment with a representative sample, I show that these preferences exist, and I investigate why people display it. Participants can permit or prevent a third party from being financially compensated for registering as a stem cell and bone marrow donor. I find that a substantial fraction of individuals permit a low payment but prevent high monetary incentives. With the help of experimental treatment variation, I show that their preference to prevent high incentive offers is caused by the desire to protect individuals who are persuaded by high incentives. Evidence from a survey experiment with ethic committees emphasizes the practical importance of this finding.
Description
Type of resource | text |
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Date created | August 12, 2021 |
Creators/Contributors
Author | Stüber, Robert |
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Organizer of meeting | Exley, Christine |
Organizer of meeting | Marquina, Alejandro Martínez |
Organizer of meeting | Niederle, Muriel |
Organizer of meeting | Roth, Alvin |
Organizer of meeting | Vesterlund, Lise |
Subjects
Subject | repugnant transactions |
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Subject | paternalism |
Subject | incentives |
Subject | experiment |
Genre | Text |
Genre | Working paper |
Genre | Grey literature |
Bibliographic information
Access conditions
- Use and reproduction
- User agrees that, where applicable, content will not be used to identify or to otherwise infringe the privacy or confidentiality rights of individuals. Content distributed via the Stanford Digital Repository may be subject to additional license and use restrictions applied by the depositor.
- License
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license (CC BY).
Preferred citation
- Preferred citation
- Stüber, R. (2022). Why High Incentives Cause Repugnance: A Framed Field Experiment. Stanford Digital Repository. Available at https://purl.stanford.edu/wm432zm3613
Collection
SITE Conference 2021
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