Why High Incentives Cause Repugnance: A Framed Field Experiment

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Abstract/Contents

Abstract
A key feature of markets for repugnant transactions is that certain transactions seem to raise moral concerns only when they involve high monetary incentives. Using a framed field experiment with a representative sample, I show that these preferences exist, and I investigate why people display it. Participants can permit or prevent a third party from being financially compensated for registering as a stem cell and bone marrow donor. I find that a substantial fraction of individuals permit a low payment but prevent high monetary incentives. With the help of experimental treatment variation, I show that their preference to prevent high incentive offers is caused by the desire to protect individuals who are persuaded by high incentives. Evidence from a survey experiment with ethic committees emphasizes the practical importance of this finding.

Description

Type of resource text
Date created August 12, 2021

Creators/Contributors

Author Stüber, Robert
Organizer of meeting Exley, Christine
Organizer of meeting Marquina, Alejandro Martínez
Organizer of meeting Niederle, Muriel
Organizer of meeting Roth, Alvin
Organizer of meeting Vesterlund, Lise

Subjects

Subject repugnant transactions
Subject paternalism
Subject incentives
Subject experiment
Genre Text
Genre Working paper
Genre Grey literature

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User agrees that, where applicable, content will not be used to identify or to otherwise infringe the privacy or confidentiality rights of individuals. Content distributed via the Stanford Digital Repository may be subject to additional license and use restrictions applied by the depositor.
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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license (CC BY).

Preferred citation

Preferred citation
Stüber, R. (2022). Why High Incentives Cause Repugnance: A Framed Field Experiment. Stanford Digital Repository. Available at https://purl.stanford.edu/wm432zm3613

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