Under the Microscope: Why US Intelligence Underestimated the Soviet Biological Weapons Program
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- Through trend and detail analysis of declassified U.S. intelligence documents, this paper shows that ambiguity in dual-use biological research was the main underlying cause of the US Intelligence underestimation of the Soviet Bioweapons program. Although lack of prioritization of biowarfare issues and complacency due to mirror imaging also existed, such intelligence failures were a result of the uncertainty caused by the dual-use nature of biological research. General statements, lack of absolute certainty about the presence of a Soviet bioweapons program, and wavering attention given to intelligence collection on bioweapons in the Soviet Union were common trends amongst the documents. The nature of biological research and public health events do not lend themselves easily for differentiation between defensive, natural, and illicit. The inability to distinguish between legitimate research and biological research for offensive military purposes was a primary reason for the lack of certainty about the Soviet Union’s pursuits in biology. This unfortunately continues to be an issue as biological technology advances. But due to the clear ambiguity in purpose and potential of dual-use biological research, as well as to avoid infringement upon scientific research, intelligence communities must create stronger relationships with the scientific community, which in turn must develop strong community-responsibility and incentives to detract scientists from pursuing bioweapons under any capacity.
Description
| Type of resource | text |
|---|---|
| Date created | May 22, 2013 |
Creators/Contributors
| Author | Zabrocka, Katarzyna |
|---|---|
| Advisor | Holloway, David |
Subjects
| Subject | CISAC |
|---|---|
| Subject | Center for International Security and Cooperation |
| Subject | Stanford University |
| Subject | declassified documents |
| Subject | intelligence |
| Subject | security |
| Subject | United States |
| Subject | Soviet Union |
| Subject | bioweapons |
| Genre | Thesis |
Bibliographic information
Access conditions
- Use and reproduction
- User agrees that, where applicable, content will not be used to identify or to otherwise infringe the privacy or confidentiality rights of individuals. Content distributed via the Stanford Digital Repository may be subject to additional license and use restrictions applied by the depositor.
- License
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).
Preferred citation
- Preferred Citation
- Zabrocka, Katarzyna. (2013). Under the Microscope: Why US Intelligence Underestimated the Soviet Biological Weapons Program. Stanford Digital Repository. Available at: http://purl.stanford.edu/wk216hz5745
Collection
Stanford University, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Interschool Honors Program in International Security Studies, Theses
View other items in this collection in SearchWorksContact information
- Contact
- kathyzabrocka@gmail.com
Also listed in
Loading usage metrics...