Keeping Pace: Analyzing Different Strategies for Governing Dual Use Risk Across U.S. Government Agencies
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- Why do different institutions address the same security challenge in different ways? A central challenge of biosecurity governance is how to stay apace of emerging biological science and technology. While almost all biology research incurs the risk for misuse, certain types of research that may incur greater risk to human health if misused have been categorized as dual use research of concern (DURC). U.S. government policies to guide public funding for DURC scope policy based on lists of experiment types and organisms that constitute DURC and require additional oversight. However, this and other definitions of DURC are often contested. Repeatedly, experts disagree on what research should be considered DURC. Moreover, they disagree on what oversight and risk mitigations strategies are appropriate. In this contested space, groups supporting research, including funding agencies, have options for how they approach DURC. This thesis analyzes how and why two major U.S. agencies, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), took different approaches to the funding of two contested DURC experiment types: gene drives and virus engineering for pandemic preparedness. Tracing each agency’s approach to funding these experiments, as well as their organizational history and structure, leads to several findings. First, when experiment types test the limits of what biosecurity policies are scoped to address, the two agencies adopt different strategies to address these risks. While DARPA takes a more hands-on approach to risk mitigation through funding security-focused projects, the NIH is more deliberative and seeks to mitigate risk through safety and security oversight measures before approving funding. Second, I find that agencies are limited in the risk mitigation options that are available, a feature driven by the organizational structure and level of expertise expected in project overseers, which selects for the agency’s approach to risk. Coherent leadership and strategies are critical for preserving the integrity of the scientific enterprise and for protecting humanity from biological threats – including natural, accidental, and deliberate release of biological products that could cause suffering. By studying the ways different agencies respond when they have to address new biosecurity challenges, governments and other organizations can better assess the effectiveness of existing biosecurity strategies, design improved policies, and structure research programs in a way that allows society to enjoy the benefits of life sciences advances without undue exposure to risk.
Description
| Type of resource | text |
|---|---|
| Date created | June 2020 |
Creators/Contributors
| Author | Elliott, Adam |
|---|---|
| Advisor | Relman, David |
| Advisor | Palmer, Megan |
Subjects
| Subject | Center for International Security and Cooperation |
|---|---|
| Subject | dual use research of concern |
| Subject | biosecurity |
| Subject | biosafety |
| Subject | gain-of-function |
| Genre | Thesis |
Bibliographic information
Access conditions
- Use and reproduction
- User agrees that, where applicable, content will not be used to identify or to otherwise infringe the privacy or confidentiality rights of individuals. Content distributed via the Stanford Digital Repository may be subject to additional license and use restrictions applied by the depositor.
- License
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).
Preferred citation
- Preferred Citation
- Elliott, Adam. (2020). Keeping Pace: Analyzing Different Strategies for Governing Dual Use Risk Across U.S. Government Agencies. Stanford Digital Repository. Available at: https://purl.stanford.edu/wd638sw6847
Collection
Stanford University, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Interschool Honors Program in International Security Studies, Theses
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- Contact
- aelliott@stanford.edu
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