Optimal Feedback in Contests

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Abstract/Contents

Abstract
We derive an optimal dynamic contest for environments where the principal monitors effort through a coarse, binary performance measure and chooses prize-allocation and termination rules together with a real-time feedback policy. The optimal contest takes a stark cyclical form: contestants are kept fully apprised of their own successes, and at the end of each fixed-length cycle, if at least one agent has succeeded, the contest ends and the prize is shared equally among all successful agents regardless of when they succeeded; otherwise, the designer informs all contestants that nobody has yet succeeded and the contest resets.

Description

Type of resource text
Date created August 20, 2021

Creators/Contributors

Author Ely, Jeffrey
Author Georgiadis, George
Author Khorasani, Sina
Author Rayo, Luis
Organizer of meeting Board, Simon
Organizer of meeting Cisternas, Gonzalo
Organizer of meeting Frick, Mira
Organizer of meeting Georgiadis, George
Organizer of meeting Skrzypacz, Andrzej
Organizer of meeting Sugaya, Takuo

Subjects

Subject economics
Genre Text
Genre Working paper
Genre Grey literature

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Use and reproduction
User agrees that, where applicable, content will not be used to identify or to otherwise infringe the privacy or confidentiality rights of individuals. Content distributed via the Stanford Digital Repository may be subject to additional license and use restrictions applied by the depositor.
License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license (CC BY).

Preferred citation

Preferred citation
Ely, J., Georgiadis, G., Khorasani, S., and Rayo, L. (2022). Optimal Feedback in Contests. Stanford Digital Repository. Available at https://purl.stanford.edu/vz068cz1509

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