Sharing costs to optimize network equilibria
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- Congestion games are a fundamental class of applications in the study of strategic behavior in large systems. In congestion games, selfish individuals act as consumers of resources at local parts of the system. These individuals typically obey their own self-interests and will not necessarily adhere to the prescriptions of a socially optimal solution. Imposing centralized control upon these individuals is infeasible, but the deployment of simple rules at a local level can limit the discrepancy between the individual goals of the system users and the global optimization objectives of the system designer. Such rules can be abstracted as cost sharing methods that distribute the joint cost on a resource among those who generate it. This thesis aims to present a comprehensive study of cost sharing as a means of decentralized control in congestion games and their generalizations.
Description
| Type of resource | text |
|---|---|
| Form | electronic; electronic resource; remote |
| Extent | 1 online resource. |
| Publication date | 2015 |
| Issuance | monographic |
| Language | English |
Creators/Contributors
| Associated with | Kollias, Konstantinos |
|---|---|
| Associated with | Stanford University, Department of Management Science and Engineering. |
| Primary advisor | Roughgarden, Tim |
| Thesis advisor | Roughgarden, Tim |
| Thesis advisor | Goel, Ashish |
| Thesis advisor | Ye, Yinyu |
| Advisor | Goel, Ashish |
| Advisor | Ye, Yinyu |
Subjects
| Genre | Theses |
|---|
Bibliographic information
| Statement of responsibility | Konstantinos Kollias. |
|---|---|
| Note | Submitted to the Department of Management Science and Engineering. |
| Thesis | Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2015. |
| Location | electronic resource |
Access conditions
- Copyright
- © 2015 by Konstantinos Kollias
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