Governing trade beyond tariffs : the politics of multinational production and its implications for international cooperation

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Abstract/Contents

Abstract
While tariffs have been effectively eliminated over the last 50 years, a number of regulatory barriers to commerce persist. This thesis explains this persistence as a consequence of the interests of firms and governments and the limits of existing international institutions. This thesis develops three general findings. First, unlike with tariffs, the elimination of regulatory barriers to trade is not in the competitive interests of the most internationalized firms. Second, governments have an interest in using regulations to attract investment and retain the profits of that investment. Third, the existing institutions that govern trade, while able to resolve tariffs, are ill suited to address the challenges of regulatory protection. These three findings, illustrated with formal and empirical analysis, explain why cooperation in the area of regulatory protection remains difficult.

Description

Type of resource text
Form electronic; electronic resource; remote
Extent 1 online resource.
Publication date 2014
Issuance monographic
Language English

Creators/Contributors

Associated with Gulotty, Robert
Associated with Stanford University, Department of Political Science.
Primary advisor Goldstein, Judith
Thesis advisor Goldstein, Judith
Thesis advisor Bagwell, Kyle
Thesis advisor Lipscy, Phillip Y
Thesis advisor Tomz, Michael
Advisor Bagwell, Kyle
Advisor Lipscy, Phillip Y
Advisor Tomz, Michael

Subjects

Genre Theses

Bibliographic information

Statement of responsibility Robert Gulotty.
Note Submitted to the Department of Political Science.
Thesis Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2014.
Location electronic resource

Access conditions

Copyright
© 2014 by Robert Joseph Gulotty
License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).

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