Misuse and manipulation : the strategic politics of military capacity building
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- How do states exercise control over military partners, particularly when building their military capacity? Put another way, how do states prevent their partners from misusing transferred military power? Typical solutions to these delegation or principal-agent problems focus on the selection of partners with shared interests or the use conditional inducements that reward compliance and punish misuse. While these strategies are employed by states, they are often insufficient. This dissertation develops the argument that states also turn to a divierse set of strategies with a common theoretical logic that I call "strategies of manipulation." These strategies take a variety of forms including tailored capacity building, resource restrictions, counterbalancing and conflict mitigation. While inducements alter the partner's payoffs to alternative outcomes, manipulation alters the partner's efficiency in producing these alternative outcomes. Specifically, strategies of manipulation create incentives for the partner to use transferred resources to advance the delegating state's objective by mitigating the partner's opportunities to bring about other outcomes through misuse. Using a difference-in-differences analysis of panel data on post-World War II interstate arms transfers and U.S. military training, policymaker interviews and illustrative historical cases, I show that concerns about misuse and strategies of manipulation motivate decision makers at important moments in history and can help explain broad patterns of military capacity building.
Description
| Type of resource | text |
|---|---|
| Form | electronic resource; remote; computer; online resource |
| Extent | 1 online resource. |
| Place | California |
| Place | [Stanford, California] |
| Publisher | [Stanford University] |
| Copyright date | 2021; ©2021 |
| Publication date | 2021; 2021 |
| Issuance | monographic |
| Language | English |
Creators/Contributors
| Author | Grinberg, Marc Toby |
|---|---|
| Degree supervisor | Schultz, Kenneth A |
| Thesis advisor | Schultz, Kenneth A |
| Thesis advisor | Fearon, James D |
| Thesis advisor | Krasner, Stephen D, 1942- |
| Thesis advisor | Weinstein, Jeremy M |
| Degree committee member | Fearon, James D |
| Degree committee member | Krasner, Stephen D, 1942- |
| Degree committee member | Weinstein, Jeremy M |
| Associated with | Stanford University, Department of Political Science |
Subjects
| Genre | Theses |
|---|---|
| Genre | Text |
Bibliographic information
| Statement of responsibility | Marc Toby Grinberg. |
|---|---|
| Note | Submitted to the Department of Political Science. |
| Thesis | Thesis Ph.D. Stanford University 2021. |
| Location | https://purl.stanford.edu/vk245ft0630 |
Access conditions
- Copyright
- © 2021 by Marc Toby Grinberg
- License
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC-SA).
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