Of land and Leviathan : how state-society bargaining shapes infrastructure in India

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Abstract/Contents

Abstract
Infrastructure is crucial for development, yet it is chronically under-provided. This dissertation focuses on a key obstacle to infrastructure development: conflict over land acquisition. Using the case of India, this study aims to understand why and when resistance to the state's use of eminent domain powers arises, and investigates two key questions: 1) what prevents mutually-beneficial bargains between landowners and the state, and 2) under what conditions can the state enforce land acquisition? Chapter 1 argues that bargaining breakdown is not solely explained by state capacity, but rather by the strength of commitment problems between state and landowners. First, landowners with a high value for land cannot credibly commit not to use protests to extract additional resources from the state. Second, the state cannot commit to compensating all landowners fairly in an environment where land records are outdated and property rights are weak. Chapter 2 uses infrastructure project announcements as a proxy for land acquisition and analyzes the impact of a reform that improved landowners' collective action capacity and worsened their commitment problem. It provides empirical evidence that variation in landowners' commitment problems explains conflict prevalence. Chapter 3 explores the impact of the state's commitment problem on infrastructure investment and project implementation. Examining a land record digitization reform, the chapter shows that stronger property rights enhance the state's ability to implement infrastructure. Chapter 4 focuses on state responses to resistance and argues that bureaucrats with local ties can improve the state's internal coherence and penetration of society, thus reducing conflict around land acquisition. This chapter shows that infrastructure projects implemented with the involvement of local bureaucrats are less likely to face conflict and stall, due to bureaucrats' effective coordination of coercion with local politicians. Overall, this dissertation contributes to the understanding of land acquisition conflicts, the importance of property rights, and the role of embedded bureaucrats in policy enforcement. The findings hold implications for policymakers seeking to address the infrastructure deficit and mitigate conflicts over land acquisition in developing countries.

Description

Type of resource text
Form electronic resource; remote; computer; online resource
Extent 1 online resource.
Place California
Place [Stanford, California]
Publisher [Stanford University]
Copyright date 2023; ©2023
Publication date 2023; 2023
Issuance monographic
Language English

Creators/Contributors

Author Toth, Aliz Barbara
Degree supervisor Grzymala-Busse, Anna Maria, 1970-
Degree supervisor Scheve, Kenneth F
Thesis advisor Grzymala-Busse, Anna Maria, 1970-
Thesis advisor Scheve, Kenneth F
Thesis advisor Gulzar, Saad
Thesis advisor Prillaman, Soledad Artiz
Thesis advisor Weinstein, Jeremy M
Degree committee member Gulzar, Saad
Degree committee member Prillaman, Soledad Artiz
Degree committee member Weinstein, Jeremy M
Associated with Stanford University, School of Humanities and Sciences
Associated with Stanford University, Department of Political Science

Subjects

Genre Theses
Genre Text

Bibliographic information

Statement of responsibility Aliz Barbara Toth.
Note Submitted to the Department of Political Science.
Thesis Thesis Ph.D. Stanford University 2023.
Location https://purl.stanford.edu/tk190bw0625

Access conditions

Copyright
© 2023 by Aliz Barbara Toth
License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).

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