Missile Motivations: Assessing Russian Noncompliance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was a landmark bilateral arms control agreement signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1987, lauded for its substantial contribution to disarmament efforts. The United States formally withdrew from the Treaty on August 2, 2019, citing years of Russian noncompliance via the 9M729 missile system. This thesis examines the underlying motivations behind Russia’s development of this ground-launched, intermediate-range missile. Four hypotheses are presented: perception of traditional military threats from NATO and the United States; perception of emerging military threats from China and neighboring regions; a desire to exert political and psychological power over Europe; and independent action by and/or influence of the Russian military-industrial complex. Two novel datasets were developed: (1) a robust timeline detailing missile development, mechanics of the violation, Russian public commentary, and U.S. response, and (2) a collection of interviews of high-level American officials and American and European academic subject experts.
Based on these analyses, I conclude that the perception of traditional threats, specifically NATO enlargement and preeminence and U.S. ballistic missile defense systems in Europe, was the most influential impetus for the development of the 9M729 missile system. Additionally, the 9M729 was seen by Russian military planners as an important response to the emerging threats from Russia’s neighbors, particularly China. The Russian military-industrial complex wanted the 9M729 in order to provide flexibility in response to an increasing number of legitimate military threats across Eurasia and believed it could develop the missile with plausible deniability. Ambitious missile modernization programs and changes in relevant political and security environments eventually prompted the Russian leadership to determine that the rewards of having the 9M729 outweighed the risks associated with violating the Treaty. Understanding the rationale behind the creation of a treaty-noncompliant weapons system is an opportunity to consider how existing and future arms control agreements can be better developed, implemented, and verified.