Design of a multilateral market for heterogeneous goods
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- This dissertation studies markets for heterogeneous goods or services using mechanism design theory. Each participant's utility is quasi-linear in money, and depend upon the allocation that he gets - thus, a participant's privately known 'type' is multidimensional. The key properties are individual rationality, incentive compatibility, budget balance, efficiency, and stability against coalitional deviations. In the second chapter, for each combination of desirable properties, I derive an assignment process with these properties in the form of a corresponding direct-revelation game, or I show that it does not exist. The main results characterize mechanisms that are ex post incentive compatible in combination with other properties. Then I apply these main results to specific applications including a labor market, a buyer-seller market, a housing market, and a partnership formation problem. In the third chapter, I study a two-sided matching market with complete information. I define the median stable matching for such markets with wages and prove constructively that it exists. In the fourth chapter, I analyze position auctions with general pricing rules. In these auctions, there are several items to be allocated which are commonly ranked by agents with unit demand. The preeminent example of position auctions is the "generalized second-price'' (GSP) auction used by major search engines to sell online advertising. \cite{edossc07} establish that the ex post equilibrium of the GSP auction and the dominant strategy equilibrium of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism have identical payoffs. I extend their result to ascending auctions with general pricing rules where the price for an item depends on the bids of agents who win lower ranked items continuously, even if the agents have multidimensional types.
Description
| Type of resource | text |
|---|---|
| Form | electronic; electronic resource; remote |
| Extent | 1 online resource. |
| Publication date | 2010 |
| Issuance | monographic |
| Language | English |
Creators/Contributors
| Associated with | Yenmez, Mehmet Bumin |
|---|---|
| Associated with | Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. |
| Primary advisor | Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 1973- |
| Primary advisor | Wilson, Robert B, 1937- |
| Thesis advisor | Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 1973- |
| Thesis advisor | Wilson, Robert B, 1937- |
| Thesis advisor | Ostrovsky, Michael |
| Advisor | Ostrovsky, Michael |
Subjects
| Genre | Theses |
|---|
Bibliographic information
| Statement of responsibility | Mehmet Bumin Yenmez. |
|---|---|
| Note | Submitted to the School of Business Administration. |
| Thesis | Ph. D. Stanford University 2010 |
| Location | electronic resource |
Access conditions
- Copyright
- © 2010 by Mehmet Bumin Yenmez
- License
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).
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