The Logics of Violence and Corruption in Organized Crime: The Case of Brazil
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- Strong regional variation in the organization of different criminal groups makes Brazil a central case to study criminal violence. In Rio de Janeiro, for instance, there are several competing organized criminal groups (OCGs) fighting against each other, as well as against the state, whereas in São Paulo, there is one hegemonic OCG. In a game-theoretical supposition in which two criminal organizations, B and C are competing for a territory or trading route and an external actor, for instance, a police agent (A) is present, both groups might try to seek support from A. A will, in turn, take the opportunity to increase their profit by accepting bribery in exchange for support. In this short paper, we will argue that previous models in the literature that try to explain variation in homicide rates in regions affected by criminal violence fail to account for collusive agreements between the state and criminal groups. Our theory predicts that, in areas where competition between different OCGs is high, the ability to collude with the state for illicit compliance and support helps OCGs to establish territorial control. In line with previous findings of the literature, this study suggests that 1) the ability to maintain collusive agreements with law enforcement actors favors territorial control from OCGs; 2) in areas controlled by OCGs, there is a trade-off between corruption and violence, in which actors will tend to prefer collusion in a long-time horizon; and 3) hegemonic OCGs are less affected by external shocks and provide a more stable governance model.
Description
| Type of resource | text |
|---|---|
| Date created | June 3, 2022 |
| Publication date | November 16, 2022; June 3, 2022 |
Creators/Contributors
| Author | Montini, Isabella |
|---|
Subjects
| Subject | Political Science |
|---|---|
| Subject | Latin America |
| Subject | Violence |
| Subject | Organized Crime |
| Subject | Brazil |
| Genre | Text |
| Genre | Thesis |
| Genre | Working paper |
| Genre | Grey literature |
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- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license (CC BY).
Preferred citation
- Preferred citation
- Montini, I. (2022). The Logics of Violence and Corruption in Organized Crime: The Case of Brazil. Stanford Digital Repository. Available at https://purl.stanford.edu/ss652pq6179
Collection
Stanford University, Center for Latin American Studies, Masters Degree Capstone Projects
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- Contact
- imontini@stanford.edu
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