The practical point of view and constructivism : from transcendental idealism to metanormative constructivism
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- This project examines a family of views that can be seen as contemporary descendants of a tradition inspired by Immanuel Kant's transcendental idealism—a constructivism about human freedom and responsibility, and about values, reasons and normative truths in practical and moral philosophy. I investigate views that attempt to vindicate practical freedom by appeal to the so-called "practical point of view." Some views are designed to show that constructivism justifies that we are genuinely free and responsible for what we do. Other views concern the constitution of human agency in their accounts and explanations of normative entities. One fundamental issue I will investigate is whether "constitutivist constructivism" can be considered a distinctive general position in practical or moral philosophy about the nature of the normative. While I think they may have distinguished their views from, on one end, dispositionalism and, on the other end, robust realism, it is a challenge to explain just how an appeal to constitutive features of human agency figures into the accounts of normative entities, and in such a way that distinguishes constructivism from already existing general positions in practical or moral philosophy. I examine three constructivist views: compatibilist constructivism defended by Hilary Bok, and the constitutivist constructivism defended by Christine Korsgaard and by Sharon Street. What makes them all count as constructivist is a sort of procedural commitment, although as we will see the procedural dimensions of their views differ. And what makes Korsgaard and Street constructivist views count as constitutivists also differ in interesting ways. I argue that constitutivist versions of constructivism can be seen as a novel and distinctive form of antirealism in metaethics or metanormative studies. To do so, I ultimately return to Kant's works. I reject judgment-dependence as the primary way to understand Kant's own antirealism and as the best way to establish an antirealism for constitutivist constructivism as well, contrary to what the constitutivist constructivists that are the subject of this project argue. I argue that insofar as we accept Alexander Miller's three ways of being antirealist (2019), we can discern a novel fourth way: a non-error-theoretic, non-expressivist, non-idealist, and non-subjectivist style of non-realism that opposes robust realism in practical and moral philosophy by denying a rational will independence of normative truths, contra what Kant calls "heteronomy, " where the nature of normative truth must be understood in relation to the principles constitutive of the activities of the rational will.
Description
Type of resource | text |
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Form | electronic resource; remote; computer; online resource |
Extent | 1 online resource. |
Place | California |
Place | [Stanford, California] |
Publisher | [Stanford University] |
Copyright date | 2021; ©2021 |
Publication date | 2021; 2021 |
Issuance | monographic |
Language | English |
Creators/Contributors
Author | Kim, Richard H, (Philosopher) |
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Degree supervisor | Hills, David James, 1947- |
Thesis advisor | Hills, David James, 1947- |
Thesis advisor | Dannenberg, Jorah, 1979- |
Thesis advisor | Wood, Allen W |
Degree committee member | Dannenberg, Jorah, 1979- |
Degree committee member | Wood, Allen W |
Associated with | Stanford University, Department of Philosophy |
Subjects
Genre | Theses |
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Genre | Text |
Bibliographic information
Statement of responsibility | Richard H. Kim. |
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Note | Submitted to the Department of Philosophy. |
Thesis | Thesis Ph.D. Stanford University 2021. |
Location | https://purl.stanford.edu/sp360wc2069 |
Access conditions
- Copyright
- © 2021 by Richard Kim
- License
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported license (CC BY).
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