An Evaluation of the Analogy Between Nuclear and Cyber Deterrence
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- The nuclear-cyber deterrence analogy is a popular and controversial comparison to make in American military, policymaking, and academic circles. Leaders in the field, many of who grew up during the Cold War, often draw the parallel to make sense of the impacts of strategic cyber weapons. Analogizing strategic cyber weapons to nuclear weapons has a powerful surface allure; these weapons have intercontinental range, near instantaneous delivery, and a growing potential for destructiveness. In particular, applying nuclear deterrence frameworks to cyberspace is appealing because it promises a way to mitigate a serious emerging threat. However, the analogy is flawed. Nuclear weapons represent a revolution in military affairs that developed into a strategic deterrent because of its unique characteristics. These characteristics include the sheer destructiveness of a single nuclear weapon, the assuredness of that destruction, and the debate over how to use nuclear weapons. Strategic cyber weapons have neither matured as a revolution in military affairs nor developed the characteristics and debate over their use to the same extent as nuclear weapons. Therefore, at this point, it is not possible to make the nuclear-cyber deterrence analogy and basing policy on the assumption that the analogy is correct is erroneous and potentially even dangerous. In the future, as the world becomes more cyber-dependent and the technology of strategic cyber weapons develops, it may be possible that the analogy will become more credible, at which point it will be necessary to re-evaluate it.
Description
| Type of resource | text |
|---|---|
| Date created | May 22, 2015 |
Creators/Contributors
| Author | Cirenza, Patrick |
|---|---|
| Author | Taubman, Phillip |
| Advisor | Blacker, Coit D. |
Subjects
| Subject | CISAC |
|---|---|
| Subject | Strategic Cyber Weapons |
| Subject | Nuclear Weapons |
| Subject | Deterrence |
| Subject | Revolution in Military Affairs |
| Subject | Center for International Security and Cooperation |
| Genre | Thesis |
Bibliographic information
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- Use and reproduction
- User agrees that, where applicable, content will not be used to identify or to otherwise infringe the privacy or confidentiality rights of individuals. Content distributed via the Stanford Digital Repository may be subject to additional license and use restrictions applied by the depositor.
- License
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).
Preferred citation
- Preferred Citation
- Cirenza, Patrick. (2015). An Evaluation of the Analogy Between Nuclear and Cyber Deterrence. Stanford Digital Repository. Available at: http://purl.stanford.edu/sh530vk4641
Collection
Stanford University, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Interschool Honors Program in International Security Studies, Theses
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- Contact
- pcirenza@stanford.edu
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