Knowing what follows : epistemic closure and epistemic logic
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- The starting point of this dissertation is a simple but central question in epistemology and epistemic logic: roughly, if an agent knows that a proposition P follows from some other propositions, must she know P if she knows the others? In other words, must the set of propositions she knows be "closed under known implication"? This idea of full epistemic closure raises a tension with an attractive idea of fallibilism about knowledge. According to fallibilism, knowing a true proposition Q does not require ruling out every remote possibility of error or deception with respect to Q. If it did, we would know almost nothing. The tension between fallibilism and closure arises when a proposition S picks out a class of remote possibilities in which Q is false, so we know Q implies not-S. While fallibilism may say that we can know Q without ruling out the possibilities picked out by S, closure says that we know Q only if we know not-S. Although not a formal contradiction, this is a tension to say the least. In this dissertation, I explore the extent to which it is possible to make fallibilism compatible with closure. I begin by formalizing a family of fallibilist theories of knowledge in models for epistemic logic. Model-theoretic techniques are used to characterize the closure properties of knowledge according to different fallibilist pictures, identify the structural features of these pictures that correspond to closure properties, transform models of one theory into models of another, prove impossibility results, and ultimately find a middle way between full closure and no closure for fallibilism. I argue that the standard versions of "Fallibilism 1.0" each face one of three serious problems related to closure: the Problem of Vacuous Knowledge, the Problem of Containment, and the Problem of Knowledge Inflation. To solve these problems, I propose a new framework for Fallibilism 2.0: the Multipath Picture of Knowledge. This picture is based on taking seriously the idea that there can be multiple paths to knowing a complex claim about the world. An overlooked consequence of fallibilism is that these multiple paths to knowledge may involve ruling out different sets of alternatives, which should be represented in our picture of knowledge. I argue that the Multipath Picture of Knowledge is a better picture for all fallibilists, whether for or against full closure. Yet I also argue that only by accepting less than full closure can we solve the closure-related problems that plague previous versions of fallibilism.
Description
| Type of resource | text |
|---|---|
| Form | electronic; electronic resource; remote |
| Extent | 1 online resource. |
| Publication date | 2012 |
| Issuance | monographic |
| Language | English |
Creators/Contributors
| Associated with | Holliday, Wesley Halcrow |
|---|---|
| Associated with | Stanford University, Department of Philosophy |
| Primary advisor | Lawlor, Krista |
| Primary advisor | Benthem, Johan van, 1949- |
| Thesis advisor | Lawlor, Krista |
| Thesis advisor | Benthem, Johan van, 1949- |
| Thesis advisor | Longino, Helen E |
| Advisor | Longino, Helen E |
Subjects
| Genre | Theses |
|---|
Bibliographic information
| Statement of responsibility | Wesley Halcrow Holliday. |
|---|---|
| Note | Submitted to the Department of Philosophy. |
| Thesis | Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2012. |
| Location | electronic resource |
Access conditions
- Copyright
- © 2012 by Wesley Halcrow Holliday
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