Clinging to Power: British Economic Policy and Political Coercion in Egypt, 1930-1952

By the onset of the Great Depression, the British Empire was in decline. As a result, the British government began to seek new methods to continue exerting British power and influence in strategically important regions overseas without risking confrontation or revolt.

What were these “new methods” of control, and to what extent were they successful? My thesis studies the interplay of British economic and political power in Egypt between 1930 and 1952 and examines how the British used economic policy to maintain political influence in Egypt during this time. Egypt constitutes a unique case among the regions most crucial to British imperial strength due to the defensive importance of the Suez Canal and the strength and coherence of its nationalist movement, which offered a singular challenge to British imperial power.

By relying on qualitative analysis of British archival records, I find that the British employed economic policy in two ways: when political negotiation was not possible, and when the government needed to cover up the political damage of its actions. In the 1930s, economic and political relations between the two countries were favorable enough that the British were willing to offer economic concessions to achieve their political goals in Egypt. Yet during and following the Second World War, the British dropped the guise of goodwill and began to impose changes by force, hoping that economic compromises offered after the fact would forestall any serious backlash from the Egyptians over this political interference. However, these cover-up methods ultimately failed, setting the stage for Egyptian revolution in 1952.