Corporate Power and the CEO Pay Ratio
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- The increase of the CEO pay ratio has been a concerning development. This increase has occurred during a period of industrial transformation, decreasing business dynamism, and growing market and employment concentration. The number of public firms is decreasing, but those at the top are increasing in size and represent a growing proportion of GDP. These changes are intrinsically linked to a rise in corporate power. Using a large panel dataset of US firms between 1992 and 2020, this study finds that these trends play a significant role in the growth of the CEO pay ratio. Specifically, the number of publicly listed firms is negatively linked with the CEO pay ratio, the firm’s employment share of its industry’s workforce is positively linked, and being among the largest firms by number of employees is positively linked. The impact of the latter on the CEO pay ratio has been increasing over time. While not every factor behind these trends is identified in this study, it offers insights into the potential determinants and the role of the CEO pay ratio as a driver of income inequality in the context of increased corporate power.
Description
Type of resource | text |
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Date modified | December 5, 2022 |
Publication date | January 6, 2022; December 9, 2021 |
Creators/Contributors
Author | Pez, Nicholas |
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Thesis advisor | Eberhart, Robert |
Department | Public Policy Program |
Degree granting institution | Stanford University |
Subjects
Subject | CEO Pay Ratio |
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Subject | CEO Compensation |
Subject | Corporate governance |
Subject | Executives > Salaries, etc. |
Subject | Income distribution |
Subject | Income inequality |
Subject | Business dynamism |
Subject | Employment concentration |
Subject | Corporate power |
Subject | Stanford University |
Subject | Humanities and Sciences |
Subject | Public Policy Program |
Genre | Text |
Genre | Thesis |
Bibliographic information
Access conditions
- Use and reproduction
- User agrees that, where applicable, content will not be used to identify or to otherwise infringe the privacy or confidentiality rights of individuals. Content distributed via the Stanford Digital Repository may be subject to additional license and use restrictions applied by the depositor.
- License
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license (CC BY).
Preferred citation
- Preferred citation
- Pez, N. (2021). Corporate Power and the CEO Pay Ratio. Stanford Digital Repository. Available at https://purl.stanford.edu/sd778jj5694
Collection
Stanford University, Public Policy Program, Masters Theses and Practicum Projects
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- Contact
- nicholaspl@gmail.com
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