Corporate Power and the CEO Pay Ratio

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Abstract/Contents

Abstract
The increase of the CEO pay ratio has been a concerning development. This increase has occurred during a period of industrial transformation, decreasing business dynamism, and growing market and employment concentration. The number of public firms is decreasing, but those at the top are increasing in size and represent a growing proportion of GDP. These changes are intrinsically linked to a rise in corporate power. Using a large panel dataset of US firms between 1992 and 2020, this study finds that these trends play a significant role in the growth of the CEO pay ratio. Specifically, the number of publicly listed firms is negatively linked with the CEO pay ratio, the firm’s employment share of its industry’s workforce is positively linked, and being among the largest firms by number of employees is positively linked. The impact of the latter on the CEO pay ratio has been increasing over time. While not every factor behind these trends is identified in this study, it offers insights into the potential determinants and the role of the CEO pay ratio as a driver of income inequality in the context of increased corporate power.

Description

Type of resource text
Date modified December 5, 2022
Publication date January 6, 2022; December 9, 2021

Creators/Contributors

Author Pez, Nicholas
Thesis advisor Eberhart, Robert
Department Public Policy Program
Degree granting institution Stanford University

Subjects

Subject CEO Pay Ratio
Subject CEO Compensation
Subject Corporate governance
Subject Executives > Salaries, etc.
Subject Income distribution
Subject Income inequality
Subject Business dynamism
Subject Employment concentration
Subject Corporate power
Subject Stanford University
Subject Humanities and Sciences
Subject Public Policy Program
Genre Text
Genre Thesis

Bibliographic information

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User agrees that, where applicable, content will not be used to identify or to otherwise infringe the privacy or confidentiality rights of individuals. Content distributed via the Stanford Digital Repository may be subject to additional license and use restrictions applied by the depositor.
License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license (CC BY).

Preferred citation

Preferred citation
Pez, N. (2021). Corporate Power and the CEO Pay Ratio. Stanford Digital Repository. Available at https://purl.stanford.edu/sd778jj5694

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Stanford University, Public Policy Program, Masters Theses and Practicum Projects

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