Children's reasoning about unconventional opinions as evidence for naive realism

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Abstract/Contents

Abstract
It has long been argued in the literature on the development of theory of mind that children possess a precocious understanding of desires. One distinctive feature of desires is their subjectivity: different people want different things, and even if someone wants something unconventional, that person is not wrong and that want is not invalid. Contrary to this normative description, recent evidence suggests that both adults and preschoolers are susceptible to the influence of naive realism—the belief that "I see the world as it really is"—and in fact treat unconventional desires as unacceptable. Given this tension, in this dissertation, I explore the bounds of children's understanding of desires' subjectivity. I argue that children treat desires as subjective when they are able to analyze desires in terms of goal-directed behavior. In Study 1, children appropriately predict the behavior of that a character's desire will elicit, even when that desire is highly unconventional. In Study 2, I present preliminary evidence that children judge at least some unconventional desires to be acceptable when they are framed in the context of a goal. Taken together, these findings add important nuance to our understanding of children's desire psychology, highlighting the ways in which preschoolers' theory of mind may build on their understanding of goal-directed behavior.

Description

Type of resource text
Form electronic; electronic resource; remote
Extent 1 online resource.
Publication date 2015
Issuance monographic
Language English

Creators/Contributors

Associated with Holubar, Taylor Fore
Associated with Stanford University, Department of Psychology.
Primary advisor Markman, Ellen M
Thesis advisor Markman, Ellen M
Thesis advisor Dweck, Carol S, 1946-
Thesis advisor Frank, Michael C, (Professor of human biology)
Advisor Dweck, Carol S, 1946-
Advisor Frank, Michael C, (Professor of human biology)

Subjects

Genre Theses

Bibliographic information

Statement of responsibility Taylor Fore Holubar.
Note Submitted to the Department of Psychology.
Thesis Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2015.
Location electronic resource

Access conditions

Copyright
© 2015 by Taylor Fore Holubar
License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported license (CC BY).

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