The Negative Consequences of Loss-Framed Performance Incentives

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Abstract/Contents

Abstract
Behavioral economists have proposed that incentive contracts result in higher productivity when bonuses are "loss framed" prepaid then clawed back if targets are unmet. We test this claim in a large-scale field experiment. Holding financial incentives fixed, we randomized the pre- or post-payment of sales bonuses at 294 car dealerships. Prepayment was estimated to reduce sales by5%, generating a revenue loss of $45 million over 4 months. We document, both empirically and theoretically, that negative effects of loss framing can arise due to an increase in incentives for "gaming" behaviors. Based on these claims, we reassess the common wisdom regarding the desirability of loss framing.

Description

Type of resource text
Date created August 10, 2021

Creators/Contributors

Author Blank, Charlotte
Author Pierce, Lamar
Author Rees-Jones, Alex
Organizer of meeting Bernheim, B. Douglas
Organizer of meeting Beshears, John
Organizer of meeting Crawford, Vincent
Organizer of meeting Laibson, David
Organizer of meeting Malmendier, Ulrike

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Subject economics
Genre Text
Genre Working paper
Genre Grey literature

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User agrees that, where applicable, content will not be used to identify or to otherwise infringe the privacy or confidentiality rights of individuals. Content distributed via the Stanford Digital Repository may be subject to additional license and use restrictions applied by the depositor.
License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license (CC BY).

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Preferred citation
Blank, C., Pierce, L., and Rees-Jones, A. (2022). The Negative Consequences of Loss-Framed Performance Incentives. Stanford Digital Repository. Available at https://purl.stanford.edu/rz763td7567

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