Practical reasons, practical reasoning
- A normative reason for an agential response (such as an action or the formation of a belief) is a consideration that counts in favor of someone's having that response, or that to some extent justifies someone in having that response. What is the nature of this relation of "counting in favor"? The project of this dissertation is to defend an answer to that question for the case of intentional actions, which I call the Reasoning View about normative reasons for action. The central claim of the Reasoning View is that we should understand facts about such reasons in terms of facts about the norms of practical reasoning. Modulo some important qualifications, this means that p is a normative reason for A to X just in case p is the content of a premise-state in a possible piece of sound and undefeated practical reasoning that concludes in the intention to X. I argue for the Reasoning View on abductive grounds: I claim that it better balances the ethical, action-theoretic, and epistemological demands on a theory of normative reasons for action than does any of its competitors.
|Type of resource
|electronic; electronic resource; remote
|1 online resource.
|Stanford University, Department of Philosophy.
|Statement of responsibility
|Submitted to the Department of Philosophy.
|Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2015.
- © 2015 by Samuel James Baillet Asarnow
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).
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