Essays in market and mechanism design
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- My dissertation consists of four chapters. In chapter 1, I study verifiable disclosure with multidimensional information. Chapter 2 (joint work with Piotr Dworczak) studies Bayesian persuasion when the Sender's preferences depend only on the mean of posterior beliefs. The first chapters present two contrasting ``persuasion'' models: in chapter 1, voluntary, verifiable disclosure (Sender has no commitment); in chapter 2, Bayesian persuasion or information design (Sender has full commitment). Chapter 3 (joint work with Nicolas Lambert and Michael Ostrovsky) studies a general model of quadratic games and characterizes their unique equilibrium. Finally, in chapter 4 I prove a novel impossibility theorem in the assignment problem.
Description
Type of resource | text |
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Form | electronic resource; remote; computer; online resource |
Extent | 1 online resource. |
Place | California |
Place | [Stanford, California] |
Publisher | [Stanford University] |
Copyright date | 2018; ©2018 |
Publication date | 2018; 2018 |
Issuance | monographic |
Language | English |
Creators/Contributors
Author | Martini, Giorgio Paolo |
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Degree supervisor | Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 1973- |
Thesis advisor | Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 1973- |
Thesis advisor | Lambert, Nicolas, 1979- |
Thesis advisor | Ostrovsky, Michael |
Degree committee member | Lambert, Nicolas, 1979- |
Degree committee member | Ostrovsky, Michael |
Associated with | Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. |
Subjects
Genre | Theses |
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Genre | Text |
Bibliographic information
Statement of responsibility | Giorgio Martini. |
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Note | Submitted to the Graduate School of Business. |
Thesis | Thesis Ph.D. Stanford University 2018. |
Location | electronic resource |
Access conditions
- Copyright
- © 2018 by Giorgio Paolo Martini
- License
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).
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