Essays in market and mechanism design

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Abstract/Contents

Abstract
My dissertation consists of four chapters. In chapter 1, I study verifiable disclosure with multidimensional information. Chapter 2 (joint work with Piotr Dworczak) studies Bayesian persuasion when the Sender's preferences depend only on the mean of posterior beliefs. The first chapters present two contrasting ``persuasion'' models: in chapter 1, voluntary, verifiable disclosure (Sender has no commitment); in chapter 2, Bayesian persuasion or information design (Sender has full commitment). Chapter 3 (joint work with Nicolas Lambert and Michael Ostrovsky) studies a general model of quadratic games and characterizes their unique equilibrium. Finally, in chapter 4 I prove a novel impossibility theorem in the assignment problem.

Description

Type of resource text
Form electronic resource; remote; computer; online resource
Extent 1 online resource.
Place California
Place [Stanford, California]
Publisher [Stanford University]
Copyright date 2018; ©2018
Publication date 2018; 2018
Issuance monographic
Language English

Creators/Contributors

Author Martini, Giorgio Paolo
Degree supervisor Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 1973-
Thesis advisor Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 1973-
Thesis advisor Lambert, Nicolas, 1979-
Thesis advisor Ostrovsky, Michael
Degree committee member Lambert, Nicolas, 1979-
Degree committee member Ostrovsky, Michael
Associated with Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.

Subjects

Genre Theses
Genre Text

Bibliographic information

Statement of responsibility Giorgio Martini.
Note Submitted to the Graduate School of Business.
Thesis Thesis Ph.D. Stanford University 2018.
Location electronic resource

Access conditions

Copyright
© 2018 by Giorgio Paolo Martini
License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).

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