The Sharon Formula: The U.S.-Israel Relationship and the Age of Israeli Unilateralism
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- Why did Israel disengage from Gaza in 2005? By analyzing my interviews with American and Israeli officials, studying memoirs by high-level officials in the United States, Israeli, and Palestinian governments, and examining government documents and the relevant academic literature, I show that contrary to the literature, the Israeli government did not decide to disengage from Gaza in response to domestic or foreign pressure. Rather, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon disengaged in order to initiate negotiations with America through which Israel could consolidate favorable shifts in American foreign policy that occurred between 2001 and 2003. In these negotiations, Israel gained American support for its positions on final-status issues, including ownership of major settlements in the West Bank and the status of Palestinian refugees. These negotiations culminated in an exchange of letters between President Bush and Prime Minister Sharon on April 14, 2004 at the White House. This thesis shows that the current literature on the topic fails to fully appreciate the significance of the April 14 Letter and the fact that Israel treated the Roadmap for Peace, created in 2003, as a major diplomatic victory. Additionally, Prime Minister Sharon and Prime Minister Olmert rejected the idea of negotiating with the Palestinians and intended to take further unilateral actions in the West Bank after the disengagement from Gaza. By analyzing this negotiation process, this thesis sheds light on the complex and calculating nature of the American-Israeli relationship. This thesis reveals that Ariel Sharon developed a formula to prevent negotiations with the Palestinians, while gaining American support for unilateral action. Finally, this thesis’ study of the American-Israeli diplomatic relationship also reveals how Israel and America’s democratic makeup prevents certainty in negotiations. Neither country can be sure of the outcome of the other country’s elections or legislative votes, which creates challenges and openings in negotiations.
Description
| Type of resource | text |
|---|---|
| Date created | May 12, 2017 |
Creators/Contributors
| Author | Quint, Yisroel |
|---|---|
| Primary advisor | Diamond, Larry |
| Degree granting institution | Stanford University |
Subjects
| Subject | Ariel Sharon |
|---|---|
| Subject | Israeli disengagement |
| Subject | unilateral |
| Subject | Gaza |
| Subject | Palestinian |
| Subject | Israel |
| Subject | Ehud Olmert |
| Subject | George W. Bush |
| Subject | minor power |
| Subject | great power |
| Subject | convergence |
| Genre | Thesis |
Bibliographic information
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- Use and reproduction
- User agrees that, where applicable, content will not be used to identify or to otherwise infringe the privacy or confidentiality rights of individuals. Content distributed via the Stanford Digital Repository may be subject to additional license and use restrictions applied by the depositor.
- License
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported license (CC BY).
Preferred citation
- Preferred Citation
- Quint, Yisroel (2017). The Sharon Formula: The U.S.-Israel Relationship and the Age of Israeli Unilateralism. Stanford Digital Repository. Available at: http://purl.stanford.edu/rh237hd3974
Collection
Stanford University, Fisher Family Honors Program in Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law. (CDDRL)
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- Contact
- yisroelquint@gmail.com
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