Analysis of national strategies for combating the proliferation of nuclear weapons
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- Analysis of strategies for stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons is often considered too difficult for quantitative rigor. Qualitative arguments abound for how to best influence potential proliferators, but these often arise as reactionary statements to immediate events without explicitly accounting for future uncertainties. Further, without detailed analysis of the costs and benefits resulting from the recommended actions it is unclear how to best compare the proposed actions. The goal of this research is to provide national decision makers with a framework for evaluating different counter-proliferation strategies and to help identify courses of action that optimally trade-off the potential ramifications of a country's acquisition of nuclear weapons against the U.S. cost for interdiction. A framework was developed to analyze the effectiveness of national strategies for interdicting a targeted country's nuclear weapons program. This framework models both the intent and capabilities of the potential proliferant using a combination of Bayesian networks and semi-Markov decision processes. Interdiction strategies are then evaluated based on their expected costs and the resulting level of militarized conflict. Historical and current/future case studies are provided to demonstrate framework validity and for illustrating potential insights from the proposed methodology. The contrasting cases of South Africa and Pakistan were modeled in their historical context. The results demonstrate the framework's ability to accurately represent different nuclear weapons scenarios. Sensitivity analyses on these cases depict plausible futures and are used as examples of insights attributable to the described approach. Modern day Iran was modeled to depict a current/future analysis using the developed framework. An optimal U.S. strategy was identified leveraging military, diplomatic, and economic interdiction options. Sensitivity analysis on the probability of Iran's leadership and on the probability of an attack against the U.S. or allies highlights the flexibility of the proposed approach for modeling a variety of possible situations and the ability to identify plausible interdiction strategies.
Description
| Type of resource | text |
|---|---|
| Form | electronic; electronic resource; remote |
| Extent | 1 online resource. |
| Publication date | 2010 |
| Issuance | monographic |
| Language | English |
Creators/Contributors
| Associated with | Caswell, David James |
|---|---|
| Associated with | Stanford University, Department of Management Science and Engineering |
| Primary advisor | Paté-Cornell, M. Elisabeth (Marie Elisabeth) |
| Thesis advisor | Paté-Cornell, M. Elisabeth (Marie Elisabeth) |
| Thesis advisor | Hecker, Siegfried S |
| Thesis advisor | Howard, Ronald A. (Ronald Arthur), 1934- |
| Advisor | Hecker, Siegfried S |
| Advisor | Howard, Ronald A. (Ronald Arthur), 1934- |
| Advisor | Perry, William James, 1927- |
Subjects
| Genre | Theses |
|---|
Bibliographic information
| Statement of responsibility | David James Caswell. |
|---|---|
| Note | Submitted to the Department of Management Science and Engineering. |
| Thesis | Thesis (Ph. D.)--Stanford University, 2010. |
| Location | electronic resource |
Access conditions
- Copyright
- © 2010 by David James Caswell
- License
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).
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