Justification of induction by inference to lesser coincidence
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- I begin by identifying David Hume's problem of induction. Hume argues that induction cannot be justified by a priori reasoning, because the failure of induction does not imply contradiction, or by a posteriori reasoning, because reasoning that the unobserved will resemble the observed based on observation would be circular. Hume concludes that induction cannot be justified by any reasoning. The principle that nature is uniform cannot be established without assuming that nature is uniform. But many paradigmatic instances of induction can be justified in terms of something weaker than the principle that nature is uniform, namely a form of reasoning I call "inference to lesser coincidence". This form of reasoning is meant to incorporate traditional formulations of the justification of induction expressed in terms of inference to the best explanation, statistical sampling, and Bayesian reasoning. My version of the argument is as follows: The conditional, time-invariant proposition that vast regularities in progress are likely to continue somewhat further is either true or false. If false, then the regularities we have observed are colossally coincidental. If true, they are far less coincidental. Therefore the proposition is probably true. If, in fact, vast regularities in progress are likely to continue, this has application to specific cases, such as the possibility that the Sun will rise again. I respond to three objections, which claim that time-restricted laws lessen the coincidence of observed regularities without making it likely that the Sun will rise again, that the "sample" of observed events might be biased, and that a zero prior probability assignment for dependence might be justified. I conclude by discussing the meaning of 'cause'.
Description
| Type of resource | text |
|---|---|
| Form | electronic; electronic resource; remote |
| Extent | 1 online resource. |
| Publication date | 2011 |
| Issuance | monographic |
| Language | English |
Creators/Contributors
| Associated with | Elstein, Daniel Jonathan |
|---|---|
| Associated with | Stanford University, Department of Philosophy |
| Primary advisor | De Pierris, Graciela Teresa |
| Primary advisor | Perry, John |
| Thesis advisor | De Pierris, Graciela Teresa |
| Thesis advisor | Perry, John |
| Thesis advisor | Crimmins, Mark |
| Thesis advisor | Ryckman, Thomas |
| Advisor | Crimmins, Mark |
| Advisor | Ryckman, Thomas |
Subjects
| Genre | Theses |
|---|
Bibliographic information
| Statement of responsibility | Daniel Elstein. |
|---|---|
| Note | Submitted to the Department of Philosophy. |
| Thesis | Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2011. |
| Location | electronic resource |
Access conditions
- Copyright
- © 2011 by Daniel Jonathan Elstein
- License
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).
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