Antitrust Law and Catastrophic Risk: Tension, Perspectives, and Reform

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Abstract/Contents

Abstract: Coordination among international companies has the potential to meaningfully assist in reducing the likelihood and severity of global catastrophic risks. Risk-reducing initiatives might include companies mutually agreeing to reduce their carbon footprint, ensure that advanced AI systems are safe and robust before deployment, or preventing malicious actors from using advances in biotechnology to create novel bioweapons. However, current antitrust law jurisprudence is hostile to these efforts. Current antitrust law categorically rejects the notion that competition can ever be harmful, for example by pressuring companies to cut corners and increase risks, instead focusing on protecting a dangerously narrow conception of consumer welfare. In this paper, I dissect this tension, trace the evolution of relevant law, apply that law in the context of existing proposals to reduce global catastrophic risks, and propose reform through a narrowly tailored statutory exemption for certain forms of corporate coordination.

Author	Calvin, Nathan
Thesis advisor	Freeman Engstrom, David
Degree granting institution	Stanford University
Department	Public Policy Program

Subject	Antitrust, artificial intelligence, climate change, biosecurity, pandemic prevention, longtermism, catastrophic risk, competition policy, international cooperation
Subject	Stanford University
Subject	Humanities and Sciences
Subject	Public Policy Program
Genre	Text
Genre	Thesis

DOI	https://doi.org/10.25740/qs509jg1024
Location	https://purl.stanford.edu/qs509jg1024

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License: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license (CC BY).

Preferred citation: Calvin, N. (2022). Antitrust Law and Catastrophic Risk: Tension, Perspectives, and Reform. Stanford Digital Repository. Available at https://purl.stanford.edu/qs509jg1024

Stanford University, Public Policy Program, Masters Theses and Practicum Projects

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