Persuasion with Verifiable Information

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Abstract/Contents

Abstract: This paper studies how an informed sender with state-independent preferences persuades receivers to approve his proposal with verifiable information. I find that every equilibrium outcome is characterized by each receiver’s set of approved states that satisfies this receiver’s obedience and the sender’s incentive-compatibility constraints. That allows me to describe the complete equilibrium set. In the sender-worst equilibrium, information unravels, and receivers act as if fully informed. The sender-preferred equilibrium outcome is the commitment outcome of the Bayesian persuasion game. In the leading application, I study targeted advertising in elections and show that by communicating with voters privately, a challenger may win elections that are unwinnable with public disclosure. The more polarized the electorate, the more likely it is that the challenger swings an unwinnable election with targeted advertising.

Type of resource	text
Date created	July 23, 2021

DOI	https://doi.org/10.25740/qm230bp6491
Location	https://purl.stanford.edu/qm230bp6491

Use and reproduction: User agrees that, where applicable, content will not be used to identify or to otherwise infringe the privacy or confidentiality rights of individuals. Content distributed via the Stanford Digital Repository may be subject to additional license and use restrictions applied by the depositor.
License: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license (CC BY).

Preferred citation: Titova, M. (2022). Persuasion with Verifiable Information. Stanford Digital Repository. Available at https://purl.stanford.edu/qm230bp6491

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