Persuasion with Verifiable Information

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This paper studies how an informed sender with state-independent preferences persuades receivers to approve his proposal with verifiable information. I find that every equilibrium outcome is characterized by each receiver’s set of approved states that satisfies this receiver’s obedience and the sender’s incentive-compatibility constraints. That allows me to describe the complete equilibrium set. In the sender-worst equilibrium, information unravels, and receivers act as if fully informed. The sender-preferred equilibrium outcome is the commitment outcome of the Bayesian persuasion game. In the leading application, I study targeted advertising in elections and show that by communicating with voters privately, a challenger may win elections that are unwinnable with public disclosure. The more polarized the electorate, the more likely it is that the challenger swings an unwinnable election with targeted advertising.


Type of resource text
Date created July 23, 2021


Author Titova, Maria
Organizer of meeting Acharya, Avidit
Organizer of meeting Callander, Steve
Organizer of meeting Eraslan, Hülya
Organizer of meeting Foarta, Dana
Organizer of meeting Palfrey, Thomas


Subject persuasion
Subject value of commitment
Subject targeted advertising
Subject elections
Genre Text
Genre Working paper
Genre Grey literature

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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license (CC BY).

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Titova, M. (2022). Persuasion with Verifiable Information. Stanford Digital Repository. Available at


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